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G~ard van den Hurk was born on Kay 13, 1913 at 
E1ndhoven (Netherlands). 
He made h1s stud1es tor the pr1esthood in the 
preparatory and major sem1naries ot the Mlsslonar1es ot the 
Sacred Heart (Dutch Provlnce), beoomlng a member ot the order 
on September 20, 1931. Atter ~rdlnat10ft on August 10, 1937, 
he completed h1s theologlcal studles and was sent to the 
Apostolio Vicariate ot Manado, whloh comprises the northern part 
ot the Island of Celebes, Indones1a (tormer Dutch East Ind1es). 
There he was apPOinted a teaoher ot philosoph1 at the Major 
a_mlnary tor natives. The oapture ot the ls1and b1 the 
Japanese, January 10, 1942, stopped all mlssionary activlty; 
all the missionaries spent the next three years and elght months 
in prlson. Post war condlt10ns made it imposslble to start the 
seimlnary agaln atter 11beration (September 1945), and 'ather 
van den Hurk was apPOinted pastor ot one ot the stations ot the 
vicariate. In addltlon, he beoame edltor ot the MalalaD 
Oatholic month11 GeredJa Katollk. Beoause ot the changed po11-
tioal sltuat10n hls Blshop sent him to the United States to 
obta1n the masters degree in ph11osoph1 betore resum1ng h1s 
taoulty post at the reopened semlnary. Father van den Hurk 
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Thomlsa 11ke ever1 818tea, aovement or 1001et" haa 
1t8 oonservatlves and lta progresslve,. Oonservatlves are those 
who thlnk that the ,'rength ot Tboml.. 11es ln Itloklng as 
010se17 al posslble to St. Thomal. Aocord1ng to thea, he has 
the solutlon to everT problem and questlon. EYerT lnv.stlgatlon 
. 
ot the op1nlons ot modern Doft-thoailt1c thinkers ls sheer waste 
ot tlme. Nothlng can be ad4ed, and oertaln11 Rothlag oan be 
altered in h1s phllosophloal teaoh1ngs. Phllos0ph1 reaohed It, 
summlt 1n his wrlting" to whlch all later generatlons have to 
go back as to the source ot all philosophlcal wisdca. 
On the other hand, the progress1ve. are ot the opin10n 
that the dootrine ot Thomas vas on17 a etage in the evolution ot 
ph1losophy, albeit a high and unsurpassed ,tage ln the hlstory ot 
phllosophy. The, do not denr, but rather expeot turther evolu-
tlon. They are 1ncllned to s~d1 other phllosophlc~ Iyst.m., 
1n the oplnion that everr human thought aust bave ltl hldden 
element ot truth, which should not be despised but valued a8 a 
vestlge ot that lnetfable Truth from whlch lt st.... TheT stand 
tor, as G. B. Phelan saY8 ot Marltain, "a llvlng, not an aroh-
aeolog1cal Tho.lsa.,l 
1937, 31. 
1 G. B. Phelan, Jaoque, !arltaln, Hew York, 
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There certainll ls place in Thoal.a tor a sound tradi-
.., 
tion; on most tundamental problems Thomas gave the answer once 
and tor all; and deviating trom him, we mlght easl1, dritt aW&7 
In that endless stream ot subJeotive error whlch modern phllo-
sophl otten seems to be to one who studles lt tro. the Itand-
polnt ot a Christian. On the other hand lt would be .trange, 
to sal the least, it Thomaa were the ultlmate phase ln the 
evolutlon ot human thought, lt philosOph1 had reaohed in hi. It. 
tinal pertectlon and were susceptible ot no turther development. 
st. Thomas hlmselt certalnly was not ot thls oplnlon. For hlm 
philosophy vas the aearch ot mankind tor truth. But as truth 
tinalll colnoldes with the Dlvlne aelng, there ls no 11mlt to 
the development ot philosophy. Man will forever dlscover new 
treasures in the hldden mines ot being. 
St. Thoaas'. reverence tor t~th made hl. Investigate 
the slstems ot pagan phl10sophers, and no man ever looked more 
palnstakingl, for the leaat partlcle ot truth In thelr writlng •• 
Had he wrltten 1n our tt.e we would tlnd quotat10n. tram the 
works ot Kant, Bergson and Jail •• as we flnd thea nov troa 
Averroe., Avloenna and Malaonldes, and even trom a charlatan 
11ke Davld of Dlnan' whoa he call. 'aost .111,8. Trl1ng to 
enrlch Thomaa t • philosophl wlth the dlscoverle. ot .odem 
phl1osophers la, theretore, undoubtedly ad .ent .. dlvl Tho.ae, 
-- -~.--
wholly in accord wlth hls lntentlon. fhl1 ls also the teaching 
of the Popes trom Leo XIII's Aeterni ~!r18 to Pius XIlt, Huaanl 
Generl., who, though he varns Oathollcs agatnst the grave errors 
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ot modern p~11osophl, alao 1.,8: 'we a&1 e.rlCh our phl10soph, 
wlth the fruits ot the progress ot the husaa mlndll • The Pope 
1s no advocate ot narrow-mlnded tradltionall ... 
A strlklns exaaple ot the 41tterent attltude. toward 
modern phllosoph, 1n !hoat... ot the 8'ruggle between OOft.erTa-
tl .. and progresslvlaa. can be tound.. 1ft the probl_ whloh 18 
. 
the 8ubJect ot thls the.la. Row tar can Thoal .. go 1ft Ita 
adaptatIon to aodern a78t ... ? There 18, I thInk, no aore 
convlnolng argument to ahow that Thoat .. Is a llvlng phllosoph, 
and not a dry tOBsll whose place 18 ln a aus ... , than the 
h18tor7 of thoalstl0 aplate.ologl. Thls hiatory ahowl bow 
Tho.ls. Is stl11 able to selze a modern probl .. , an4, with the 
use ot Its agelesa prlnoiples to solve 1t and lnoorporate 1t In 
Itselt-- not In the va, ot eoleotl01" but aaklDg It Into a 
homogeneous adaptatloR. 
When fhomlam awoke ln the 19th century, atter a long 
perlod ot letbarl1, lt tound Itselt contronted wlth manT 
entlrely new problems, the lIost iaportaftt of vhloh oertainll vas 
the problem ot knowledge. ror aan, ceat.r1e. aall had u.84 hl1 
Intellectual raoul', wlthout e.er asklng himself vhether the 
knowledge It gave hl. aocuratel, represented reallty ex1stlng 
0.t814. himselt. He had alva,s taken lt for granted that real 
th1ngs exlste4 outslde hlmself and that his lntellect gave h~ 
1 Plus XII, ljwaaJIl Gener18, lev 'fork, 1950, 16. 
rellable lntoraatlon about them. Phl1osophers had asked them-
selvea whether the lnt.lleot was a suitable instruaent to lead 
to truth. Thls was the 80-oalled soeptioal problem, whlch was 
alIIost aa old as human speoulatlon. But man had never aeked 
himselr whether the lntellect reaohed reallty outside his mlnd, 
extramental r.ality. He had never doubted that. The questlon 
. 
had never been ral.ed and, theretore, had never been the obJeot 
ot solentltlc lnvestlgatlon. Though reallsm was at the basls 
or all phl1osophlcal lnqulrles up to the Renaissanoe, lt bad 
never been sclentlfloally proved and ls, therefore, oalled 
Inalve rea11 .. •• Van Steenberghen says that Thoaa.·s reali .. 
cannot be called "popular reall.' (hi. equlvalent of nalve 
reallsa) because 'the dootrlne 'or abstractlon and the dootrlne 
ot Jude-ent, the dootrlne or reflexlon and tbe theory or truth, 
the orltlo1sm or the tlrst prlnolples and the unlversals, the 
doctrlne or qulddltles and all the Thomlstlc 10g10, are not 
merel, doctrines of oommon •• ns .... l 
This 18 certalnly true; the above .entloned doctrlne. 
are no dootrlnes ot oommon sense but the results ot protQund 
philosophlcal speoulatlons. However,-- and thls Van 
Steenberghen s ... s to torget-- ths, are all ln the tleld of 
ps,chologr and 10g10 and not ln the tleld ot epistemology 
strlotl, sp.aklng. lowh.re ln the works ot St. Thomas v111 you 
1949, 58. 
1 ,. Van St •• nberghen, 121at •• ologz, II .... York, 
- (; - " 
tl1l4 an .xp,.,l tlon of the 14.all.,tlc proD.l .. , whether and In 
what degree the Iftt.lleot reaohes extramental reallt" what 
Is the value ot Intelleotual knowledge. St. thomal, 11k. all 
phIlosophers ot hls age, took realism tor granted. Th.retore, 
his must also be called nalve or popular reall •• , 1.e., no' 
solentltloal11 JustIfIed. 
. 
At the beglnnlng ot Iledern t1l1 •• , hovever, Descart.s 
stated the prlnclple. troa vhloh Ideall .. aro.e. Dl.appointe4 
with the poor re.ults ot late-soholastlo Ipeculatlon he lett 
the path ot soholastl0 •• tbod In .earoh tor ... ethod whioh 
would glve hla aore satlstactory result.. He round It 1n the 
aethod ot aatheaatloa. fhl ••• thod va. bound to loosen the 
relatIon betweeA thoughtand realit, and was,ther.tore, the 
tirst step to 14eall&8. Though D.scartes hlaselt alva,. 
r_alAed a reall.t, hi. use ot the _theaatlel .,thod and the 
doctrln.s It led hi. to JU8t11 earned tor him the naae -'ather 
ot Id.all .. •• 'or .xample, he was a •• dletlst, t.aohlng that 
the mlnd knows dir.ct17 onl1 Ita Ideas. 
A new probl .. had b.e. oreated, th,14eal1st10. 
probl_, the pro'bla ot the value of h_an knowledge, It soon 
became 80 1aportant ~t 1t vas eonslA.red the aaJor. aad In 
many ca8.S the anlr pl'Obl. at ph110sophioal 'Peculat1oa. 'or 
manr modern systems the solution ot th1. problea .eans also the 
end ot the1r phl10soph7. 
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Ille revlver. ot !boJllam 1n the 19th centurT under-
stood that a yery lmportant part ot thelr task would be to 
glve a satlstaotory solutlon ot thla probl... The, regarded 
the problem aa a real one and trled to giV. lt & .olutlon. 
Whereas the solutlons glyel' to It D1 modem philosopher ..... r. 
all Ideallstlo, modern echolaetlca und.rstood that aa 14eallstlo 
solution vould •• an d.ath tor Thoa1... Th., vere contldent 
that Tholllstlo prlnclpl •• would lead th_ to a real1st1. 
solutIon. 
ror the •• thod to be uee4 In tbiB lnvestlgation they 
looked toward modern philosophers. There the, to\U'l4 that the 
method general17 used .lno. the '1.. ot Kant waa the •• thod ot 
cr1t10al lnvestlgatlon. Kan,. 'fholllats ,pled to oo.e t. a 
solutlon b, uelaa th1e •• thod ot a cr1t1cal lnv •• tlgatlon (tor 
this reason call1ng thelr In.estlgatlons Critioa), and a&ft, 
also used another •• thod ot modern philosoph1, vls. »esoartes· 
methodloal doubt. 
The vhole developaeat ot Thomlstlc epletemolog1 Ihowl 
that it 18 verT •• oh indebted to modern 87st .... both 1n regard 
the accepting ot the quest10n and the methods leadlng to 
lts solution. Reaotion to the idealistic 'endenoiee ot earl1 
neo-soholast10 solutions to the eplsteaologloal problem was 
bound to co.e. Alread In 1929 i. de Tonquedeo wrote: 
-the theory whloh make. aethodloal doubt the tlrst 
stage ot orlt1oal philosoph, 18 a badl, dlge.ted 
theor" unrealistic and full ot superticlal vlew-
polnts: the PSTchologloal data are analysed ln It 
- 7 -
1n an lnexact wal. d1stor\d an4 presented 1n a 
talse~llght- whlch ls on the whole the 11ght ot 
modern ldea11ca. 81 
Betore him Charles Borer had alrsadf or1tl01sed the 
same thlng. His oplnion was that eo •• !homlsta bad gone too 
far 11'1 tbelr adaptation to modera ldeall... And 1I14ae' the 
or1tloal proble. 1s a delloate one. 7.0 large oonoesslons '0 
1dealism may make lt Insolwble: 
Koreover 1t 1s a problem with tar-reaoh1ng ph1l-
osoph10 oonsequences, which demands aore than the usual prudenoe. 
Some or1t1cs thought that apologetio conslderatlons had made 
several Tholllsts lose s1ght or this prudel'1o.. The,. wute4 to 
refute ldeallam tram the standpolnt ot the 14ea11st hlas.lf, 
forgetting Gllson'. warn1ng that once you start as aft 1deallst, 
you are condemned to r .. a1n an ldeal1st torever. 
Thes. or1t101_s, however, were 411"80ted onll agalnst 
1ndlv1dual polnts ot neo-scholast1o aplateaolog)'. But ln 1936, 
1n a 11 ttl. book !:t! ft!!!.lsae •• thodlque2 Et1enn. GUIOD or1 t-
lelsed the eplat_ologloal .e'hod used bl Tholllsts up to bi. 
tl •• , 1 ••• , the •• 'bod ot crltlcal real1... As lts ohlet 
representatlve. Gl110D took Xercler and loll; but h1s orit-
icl... we1"e not restrloted to speclflc 'eaohlng. ot LouTaln. 
p. 4
A:.J. 4e 'fonqu.edec, Orltlg~,!t ~ !! Connal.sanee, 
Par1s, 1929, "It" 
Parls, 19M. 
2 Itlanne Gl1s0A, L. R'!118 •. ~ .tthodlg ..... e. 
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Gilson's critics pOinted out that hls blanket oondemnatlon ot 
<II 
crl tical reall_ was supported onlY' br arguaents agalnst the 
critlcal reall.- of the Louvain school, chlet11 that ot Mercier 
and loel. l 
Moreover the, were anxlous to hear how he would 
defend realism lt not br .eans ot a crltlque. Theretore, he 
wrote a .econd book ln whloh h. trled to show that hi, 
critiolam. not onlY' struok .ercler and Joel but all Thomlsts 
who held crltlcal reall_. ae expanded the 11s' to Include 
all outstandlng fhoalsta ln eplstemologY' and also trled to 
prove that wlthout a crltlque he could stl11 hold a phl1oso-
phlcallY' Justlfled reallsm. Thls •• cond book waa atallsme 
Thomlste !! Crltlgue !! l! Connal.sance. 
In the pretace to hls .econd book he sars that he bas 
been shooked bY' the expressions ot Thomlstl, Itor whoa the 
notlon of evidence ,eeas to have loat all value, and that ot 
human knowledge all slgnlflcatlon-, and he presents his book 
a8 "a crltical anal,sls of carte.lano-thoa1 .. and kantlano-
thoalss·. Among the Thoalst, tor whoa the notlon ot human 
knowledge 8eems to have lost all slgnltlcance, we are astonished 
to find Noel, Rolland-Golsel1n, Marachal, Jollvet, Karltaln, 
qulte a gallerY' of promlnent sod ern Thoalsts. Se proalses to 
1 Etlenne Gl1son, Reallam. Thomlsts !! Crltlgue 
!! !! Connalssanos, 'arls, lOSe, p. 5. 
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cr1tlclse w~at he oalls the 'debauches ot phl1osoph1cal 
ooncordl .. •• 
Even betore taklng note ot Gilson'. orltlol ••• ln 
detall, ever1bod7 wl11 agree that the.e are expression. t;plcal 
ot conservatlsm. According to R. Verneau. in a studT ot 
Gl1son's eplste.ologr, ln connectlon with thls book, Thomi .. 
such as Gl1son protesses must be calle4 wlth a word ot Harltaln 
'antlmodem,.l "Thoalsts who put the orltloal questlon are 
lpso facto dlaloyal to Salnt Thoa.s,.2 
Fr. L. Regls, who shares the vlews of Gilson, puts 
h1s 1ndlgnatlon in a beautlful metaphor sa,lng that 'Thoalea 
has b.en pulled for too long by an lde.11stl0 tug-boat , •3 
Fr. Smlth, a180 a staunch defender ot Gl1son t s vlews, oalls hi. 
books enthuslastloall, a 'date ln the hlstor, ot eplatemolog,', 
d1viding eplstemology into two perlod. 'ante G1lson and post 
Gilson D• 4 
What makes thls dlscusslon so extremelf lnterestlng 
is that we witness a struggle between the two wings ln Tboal .. , 
Traditlonallsm and Progresslvl •• , a struggle ln which the most 
1 Etlenne Gl1son PbllosoRhe de la Ohretlent., 
Parls, 1949, p. 217. -- --
2 ~, p. 215. 
3 L. X. Reg 1 a , ~alnt fbgmas and Epl.temo1ogl, 
Milwaukee, 1946, p. 8. 
1943, p. 248 4 G. Smlth, !a! Xaritaln Voluae or !he Thomlst, 
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out.tanding~Tho.lsts ot our da,s are lnvolved. Horeover, the 
subJect of the quest10n ls not a phllosoph1cal probl.. ot 
m1nor importance, but the question around whioh the whole 
phllosoph1 ot modern t!Bes pivots. I lntend, atter an 
expositlon ot G1lson'. critlc1 ... to subJeot them to a orltical 




GILSOH'S ORITICISM or CRITIOAL REALISM. 
In order to obtaln a aore obJeotlve vlew ot Gllson's 
thought about crltlcal r.all .. a tirst chapter wl11 b. d.voted 
to an ,xposltlon ot hls crltlo1s •• contaln.d ln the two books 
wlthout crltlcal remarks. In thls var hi. oplnlon wll1 be 
shown to better advantag., wlthout obJ.ct10ns block1ng the 
.. ooth tlow ot hls thought. 
The teach1ng or the two books wl11 be .xplalned 
,eparat.ly, slnoe there ls a certaln progress ln hls crlticl .. 
/ 
ot crltlal r.alism. Van Rle' polnts out ln LtEplstemologle 
Thomlstel that three perlods oan be dl.tlngulshed ln G11son'. 
eplstemology. Th.re i. a slow .volutlon troll 1927 to 1942, 
trom what Gllson calls pure methodloal r.allsm to a philo.ophic-
ally round.d and derended attltud. in his late.t edltion ot 
.L! fho.l.... In b! Reallsme Mithodlque and Reall ... Thoml.te 
we have two stage. ot thl. evolutlon a8 vell In his arguments 
agalnst orltlcal reall •• as ln hls own epistemological dootr1ne. 
A. I.E REALISMI METHODIQUE. 
In thl. tir.t book Gilson's orltio1 .. ot the posltlon 
ot hls opponent. 18 less apodlct1oal. He s.ys that 'the way ot 
eXplalnlng Tholl18l1, he (Noel) otters u .• , i. hard to reoonolle 
/' 1 Van Rlet, &tEplsteaoAogle Thomlste, 
Louvaln, 1946, 496. 
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wl'h 'the splrl't ot fhoat .. •1 bu~ allo that Noel perhapl use. 
"I 
tbe word ·orltlque- ln another lenle than he (Gl1.oat and that, 
theretore, 've are not 10 tar troa e .. eb other al lIa, 1 •••• 2. 
What he denounoe. are oonoel.lons mad. to ideall .. b, 
Thomlltl, and the word 'orltloal real1 .. - tlnd. no tavor in hl. 
e1e.. fo look tor a or1tloal reall .. 1. to look tor a contra-
dlotion; lt 1. 11ke ••• klng a .quare C1rol.3• Se even .a7. 
that a realistlc orltlque ot knowledge ls worle than a Iquare 
4 
olrele. 
'lbe thesls ot thls book 11.7 well b. thul expresled: 
modern ph110.oph1 and !boal .. are irreconcllable; 14e.llst10 
elementl mUlt be kept ou~ ot Thoal .. , becau.e ~.7 wl11 proye 
tatal to It. 
Eminent hlstorlan, G1llon out11nes ln a tew page. 
modern philosoph, with the roles played in lt b7 De80arte. and 
lant, neatly polntlng out the essence ot thelr s1st ... and how 
a tundamental error necessarll, brought thea to 1 t. Settlng 
Soh01a8tlc~ .. againlt modern pb11o.ppbJ, he show8 how the, are 
1 Gilson, L! Realls •• !e\bo41gue, 43. 
2 ib1d, 27. 
3 1b14, 10. 
4 1b1d, 83. 
- 13 -
as dltteren~ as two world. and how the~e 1. an unbrldgable gap 
between them. 
IEvery oomproal.e wlth Ideallsa,· he oonolu4 •• , 'has 
to be avo'14.4,1. Conce.slons ma4. to Ideall .. IIU.t prove fatal 
to ThOlll.tlo reall.lI. Over and over he repeats a. a wa",lns: 
IKe who starts as all Idealls' I. bound to end up as an 
1deallstl2• There 1. no pa.saSe possible trom the world ot 
Ideallsa to realls •• 
In modern hlstory the tlgure ot lant stand. .e a 
warnlng. His attltude ot orlt101 .. torbade bta to e.tabllah a 
world ot realit,. ae saw .,.er, olearly that onoe tilt orltique 
ot knowledge was hls pOlnt ot departure he would ne.,.er be able 
to assert an,thlng about realit,. His sound reason, howe.,.er, 
told him that thl. was an impossible polnt ot .,.lew. !heretore, 
he resorted to postulates and gave his phl10soph7 titls teatur. 
ot dlsorepano" atflrmlng and de.y1ns reallt, at the .... tta •• 
Idealls& and reall.a do not tON aft 8IIalg ... 
Yet thls 1. Just what .e •• e happen In modera Tholll ... 
The.e phl10sophers take aa tb.lr point ot departure the orltique 
ot Ideallsm. The, tr1 to estab11sh the .,.alue ot 1ntelleotual 
knowledge by a orltlque as lant 414. This crlt10lsm 18 nothing 
1 Ibld, p. 86. 
2 !B!!, p. ., 10, 48, sa, etc. 
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else but a (ora ot ldeallsm. Therefore, lt oan never lead to 
reall .. even though these phl1010phers olalm that 1t doe •• 
s The reason wb, lt oannot 11 that orltique luppoes that reall88 
has not yet been establlshed. It lt were establlshed there 
would be no reason tor crltlque. Sut lt the tlrst act ot the 
lntellect 1. not about reallty, no lubsequent aot can lead to 
reallty. 
the whole questlon depends on ·what 1s the meanlng 
ot the word ·orltlque'. Is 1t belng used b, !homlsts ln the 
same sense as Ideallsts US8 1t? Gilson lays that lt ls, and 
that lt must be. He dlstlngulshes three posslble meanlnge ot 
the word 'orltlque ot knowledge- as he say. ln ~ Reallsme 
1 Method19ue • 
Crltlque ot knowledge oan .ean a retlexlve analysls 
to show the role ot subJeot and obJeot ln the aot at knowledge. 
Or 1t oan mean a or1tlque ot dltterent klnd. ot knowledge 
(1ntelleotual and lenslble) to deolde whloh are the marks ot 
truth and talsenesl. Gl110n doe. not have any obJeotlon 
agalnst these two klnds ot or1tlque, because thelr polnt ot 
departure ls reall... Onoe we alread1 have establlshed that 
our lntelleot oan reaoh real1t1, we start exam1ning 1n what 
degree 1t oan and what are the oondlt10nl. 
1 ~bld, p. 85. 
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~ere 11 a thlrd k1nd ot cr1t1que of knowledge, 
however, which OOftllltl in sabaltt1ng the lntelleot to aft 
examinat10n in order to lnve.tigate whether 1t CaD attain 
real1t, or not. fhil 1s the kind ot crit1que used b1 the or1t-
lcal realist.l. In order that 1t be a reall, orlt1oal lnvestlga-
tlon one has tirst to abstain trom reali... It must be AD 
a priori exaaination, as Gllson sa,8. But, theretore, one has 
to abandon reall.- and adopt ldeallsa. 
There ls no esoape, however, trom ldeali... The 
critical approaoh mlght poss1bly lead to medlate realls., 
whlch must ultimatel, ooae to ldeallea allo, but oertalnl, not 
to immedlate reallsm a. Roel wants. Kedlate reall .. 18 It •• lt 
one ot these conoes810ns to ldeallsa. Thomlats ot the earl1 
nec-Ioholaeti0 renalssanoe (aedlate realllts) d1d not s.e that 
. . 
there was no wal out ot thelr probl_ but ldeall... Afterwardl 
they discovered that the, had gone too tar. 'oday med1ate 
re.lisa has no adherents among fhomlsts. 
On the other band Gileon explalns: -'rom tbe ao.ent 
one admlts lamed1ate rea11aa, 1t ls imposs1ble by det1nltlon to 
4eaonatrate or prove the existenoe ot the exterlor world. dl 
1 ... d1at. reall .. excludel orltlcal reallsm. It Hoel 18 an 
lamed1ate reallst, he must be such ftotwlthstandlng hl. orltical 
polnt ot departure. 
1 1b1d, p. 40. 
-
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'r()l!put the whole question 1n a tew word.a, G1lson's 
argumentation amounts to this: It realism has to be proved, 
at what point ot departure can one begin? It one begins wlth 
a rea11stio point ot view, then no real proof 11 possible. 
It one begin. w1th an 1deal1stic po1nt or v1ew, realism oannot 
be proved. There 1. no escape !rom ldeall ... 
A leoond obJectlon i. oonneoted w1th this. An unbias-
ed or1tieal examination ot huaan knowledge, ln whloh reall .. 1. 
not to be 8uppo8ed, make. eplstemology the tirst ot ph1loso-
phical 8elences. Metaphysics treats about belng. But 1t 1s 
olear that the question whether we oan know be1ng has to be 
estab11shed betore .e start workin. on be1ng. 
But, aa Gl1son eays, lt oannot be proved. AArone who 
1nsiats on its proot aust .Deoe.8arily be led to 1dea11sm, wh10h 
destroys metaphysics. Theretore, ·we see no other alternat1ve 
today, exoept to renounoe metaphysics or to ret.ra to a pre-
crlt10al reall."l. 
Be givee this adv1ce to Thomlsts: ·what ODe has to do 
ls, to liberate one.elt trom the obse.slon ot eplstemolog1 as 
• prellmlnary conditlon '0 phll0S0phY'S. 
Orltloal rea11sm glves !hoalea thls aab1suou. 
att1tude, lt uses an ldeal18tl0 method to reach a reallst10 loaL 
-
1 lb1d, p. 15. 
-
2 lbid. p. 1 •• 
-
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Neither ldeal.sts nor realists f1nd this satisfactory. Noel 
for instance use. Descartes' doubt and establishes immediate 
realism by means of It. Se really never leaves realit,. 
Ideallsts will say that he did not understand Desoartes, or it 
he did, he seems to be dishonest. It seems as it he pretends 
to use an ldealistio method, ln order to bring ldealists baok 
. 
to realism, whereas he really does not use It. 
On the other side neither does it satisty Tho.ist. 
because they feel thl. brlnglng of ideallstic elements lnto 
Thomism as belng unfaithful toward St. Thoaa.. Oritical 
realism ls, therefore, ·one of the aost I.rlous obstacles to 
the full flourlsh of a !"snewed real1811l 1l • l 
In the last ohapter, whloh 18 oalled 'Advioe for a 
beglnning realist', h' says that a modern man ma, find it very 
hard not to be allowed a orltlcal attitude, but that 'the 
reallst has to submit oneself to it tor the orit1oal Ipirlt 
is the very point of 148&11 .... 2 
B. REALISME '1'HOMIS'1'); 1:'1' CRITIQUE DI LA COINAISSANOE. 
Because of the many reactlons L! Reallsme Methodlgue 
eVOked, Gilson felt compelled to explaln h1.selt .oreclearl,. 
Although his crltic1sms ln ~ aeallsm, Hethodlgue were directed 
Ohiefly against Merc1er and loel, other fhomlsts, call1ng 
1 ~, p. 84. 
2 .ill!. p. 98. 
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themselves crltlcal reallsts, saw thelr syste. threatened by 
<It 
h1s attacks. l Moreover there was a general curlos1ty about 
how Gllson was golng to bulld up an eplste.ology lt not b, way 
at a crlt1cal 1nvestlgat10n. Theretore, he wrote thls new book, 
as he explalns 1n lts pretace. 
The t1rst slx ohapters are 4 .. ot.4 to crltic1sms ot 
. 
varlous Thomlsts, 1n the last two he glr •• a poslt1ve exposl-
tlon ot hls ep1stemology. It ls not the purpose ot thls thesls 
to tollow hls crltlcl" ln deta1l. We are not so muoh pre-
occup1ed wltb answerlng partlcular crlt101 .. s as w1th detendlng 
ln general the lawrulness ot uslng the crltloal el .. ent ln a 
Thomlstlc eplstemolog,. Horeover hls cr1tlcls. ot tbe d1tterent 
s1ste.s always amounts to the saae oharge, ot us1ng orlt1que 1n 
establ1sh1ng the value ot 1ntellectual knowledge and thereby 
devlat1ng Thoalsm tro. lta rea11st1c poslt1on 1nto ldeall ... 
In th1s book h1s crltlcls. 18 .uoh more developed and explalned 
ln a clearer and lIore oonvlnclng way. 
Hls crit101s.s oan be summed up 1n two thesls: 
(1) The orlt1cal .ethod used by Thoalsts to establlsh 
the value at lntellectual knowledge aust lead to ld.all .. ; or, 
1 To speak or crltloal real1sm as Ithe doctrlne 
ot the Louva1n School' ls certalnl, not correct. Jollvet calls 
orltloal realls. ·co.mon 1n Thoml .. ' Jollvet, &e Thomlsme et la 1rtt1gU f! !! l!: .... nals.anc., Parlel933, p. 29. dIlson oppen=-
ens ln Le Rialisme R.thodI~ue were m&1nl, Xercler and Nail, but 
ln Realiai. ,60.18t. the, are tor the aOlt part not trom Louvaln. 
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it it does n2t, it is useless, because then it doe8 not estab-
lish an,.th1ng. 
(2) This crit10al aethod makes •• taph781c8 dependent 
on eplatemology and thereby destroys its unoondltlonal primac7. 
GILSON'S FIRST TH~SIS 
As we have stated th1s tirat thesls, it 1s given 1n 
. 
almost the exact words ot Gileon. l We shall atteapt to 
reproduce here hls explanatlon and detense of the position 
represented by this thesls. 
What do Tholl1sts meaD when the,. speak ot ·critical 
real1 .. ,- H1storioally the tera is ua.a 1n contrad1stinction 
to a 80-oalled na1ve realism, a rea11 .. based on coaaon .ense. 
This 1s the real1 .. ot the noa-ph11osopher. ot the man on the 
etreet. It 1. not 801entlflcal11 Ju.tltle4. Though thl. 
reall_ ls pertectl,. all r1ght, ln order to be u.etul as a 
~asls tor ph11osophloal speculatlon 1t IIU8t be phl1osophlcall,. 
establ1shed. fhl. 1s done br way ot a refl.z1on. 
Gl1lon agrees with all thie. .alve reall .. i8 non-
phllosophlcal. In order to make it phllosophical, reflezion 
has to be used. 'fhis makes 1t a re.11sm which 1s conscious of 





oertitud. ot~common sense.l But does this make lt a critical 
reali .. , It sakes lt onl1 a reflexlve or phllosophlcal 
reall... Otherwlse the whole philosoph, a.7 b. oalled 
critioal.1 
The word ·crltloalU , theretore, 1s ent1rel, super-
fluous; lt has no •• anlng_ The reall .. or ever1 philosopher 
aust be a phllosophioal or reflexlve rea11sm, bvt that 18 not 
suffiolent reason tor oalilng lt a orltloal r.ali... The word 
·oritioal- 1s not on11 superfluous but a180 oonfuslng. It was 
flrst used by lant, who gave lt a apeolal •• aning lntlaatell 
connected wl th h1. 14eall_. The lantlan u.e ot the 'era 
ralses serlous objections agalnst a fhomlstl0 use ot the WO~. 
It lt means An,thing more than reflexive or ph1losoph1oal 
reall .. , lt must aean loaethlng ln a Xantlan or 14ea11stl0 
•• nse and, theretore, gravel, oollprOflis •• Tholllsta who 1&S8 It. 
Among the most olear-sighted cr1t1cal realista, Gllson 
t1ndl the work cr1tlque u.ed 1ft the sen.8 ot refleilon onll, 
wlthout anT other •• anlng; and he quotes •• an .... pl. a SeD-
tence ot K.gr. L. Noel. 3 Karl taln too 18 plaoed 1n th1s 
oategorl, although tb. latter verr olearlf dist1nguish.s b.tween 
tritique and a ph110sophy, and detlnltell vlndicates the notlon 
-
1 1bld, p_ 39 
-
2 lbld, p. 38 
3 lb14, p. 37. 
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ot critlcal reall ... 1 
41 
Other fhoalsts however, accordlng to Gl1son, glve 
the word crltlque a meanlng dltterent trom retlexlon. The, 
want to st.te so •• thlng more than that thls reall .. 18 brought 
troa a common sense to a phllolophioal Itage b, a retlexlon 
only. Accordlng ~o their oplnlon thil rftJ..xlon doel sOlIe thl ng 
. 
.0 ••• In that ca.se the, aust take the word critlq.ue ln the 
sense glven to it b7 lant. who tlrst uled It. He was the tlrl 
to ralse the so-aalled crltlcal problem. Moreover the oritloa 
proble. vas lntroduced lnto !boala. ln order to give an answer 
to lan" s ldealla. But ln order to answer lant fhalsts aust 
start trom the SaDle proble.. fhls was lndeed the blg probl .. 
ot the ear11er I.o-Soholastlcs; how to aRsw.r the ldeallst8. 
The1r dogaatl0 realls. dld not oontain a lat18t,lng answer to 
the ldeallstl0 pos1tlon. So the, trled to tlnd an answer to 
'ant trom Xant's ovn vlewpolnt. fhls vas the be.lnnlng ot 
crit1cal rea1188. Gilson doubts whether thl. va. ave., wls. 
aove tor !hoal ••. 
1. On 'aocount ot the deferenoe w1 th lIhlch (U180n 
treats Kar1ta1n, whom he mentloDs onl, ln a tootaote, although 
Harltaln 1s also a critioal rea1!st, Ksgr. Joel makes the 
naught1 remark: X. Gilson tralt. M. Marltal. aV80 beauooup;Lus 
de menagement que 1& colleotion de soutane. - blanohes, nolres 
vl01ettes ou meme roug¥es (o~Tlous11 reterrlng to Ro1lan4-
Gossel1n O.P., the Jesu1t and .eoular prlests, Magr. Noel and 
C~rdlnal Meroler)- quIll bou80ule aveo entraln a tous les coln 
Ou 11 lee trouv.-
L. Noel, ~ ReallSM. Immedlat, p. 61 
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A brlet historical survey ot how lant oame to his 
<II 
problem and how he lolved 1t, may help to understand the posl-
tlon ot Thomistio reali ... l 
Kant tr1ed to f1nd the reason tor the wonderful 
progress ot the sclenoea he d1100vered and on the other hand the 
deoa1 ot philosoph,. That reason, he thought, was that philos-
oph1 ueed the wrong .ethod. Theretore he trled to glve 
philosoph, a better •• thod. He dlstingulshes between alalrt1cal 
and synthetlcal .. a prlori and a posterlor1 Judgments. He tound 
that .rnthetical a pr10ri Judgments are the only ones wh1ch 
augment our knowledge and at the same tls. have sclentltl0 value 
An .. ,tlcal Judgments have no value be'ause the, do not add any-
thlng new to our knowledge. B1 analysis we oan onll see what 
the Judgment already contained. NothIng new is found. Synthet-
ical a poster10rl Judgments are usele.s for sclenoe also, beoaua 
they never lead to generall, valuable knowledge. Tbe only tblng 
they glve us are ooncrete tacts; they oannot glve us laws wh10h 
we need tor sclenoe. The pOBsIbl1it, ot phllosophy theretore 
depends on the synthetlcal a prlorl Judgments. With th1. knowl-
edge Kant instltute. a crltique 1n order to tind out whether 
there are ln the intellect prlnc1ple. which torm these .ynthetic 1 
a prlorl Judgmenta, what prlnolples they are, and how they 
operate. This Is b1s cr1tique ot pure reason. 
-
1. i.Gllson, Reallsme Thomlste p. 162 
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fhls orltlque 18 an a priori examination prlor to any 
~ 
senslble experlenoe. It has to bet because. If lt were not, It 
would not be a orltlque or Judgaent of pure reason. Something 
else outslde the aotlvlt1 ot the Intelleot would be lnvolved. 
No a posteriori elements ma1 beoo.e Involved beoause that would 
bring In senslble knowledge, whlch would lead the philosopher 
outalde solentltlc metaphyslcs. For lant thls a prlorl element 
18 essentlal. Be has to Itart trom the pure Intelleot prior to 
any sense actlvlty. 
Evident11 such crltlque can never end wlth reallsm. 
It purposely excluded realla. at Its polnt ot depar~ure. There-
tore It Thomlsts take the same attitude a8 (ant's they have to 
start from Ideall .. also, but that w111 prevent them trom ever 
reachlng realism agaln. It 1s olear that no Thomlst can hold 
this. 
But although they do not bold thls, they must hold 
lomething slmilar In order that their or1tlque really r .. $1ns a 
,f,ltlque and does not beoome Just a word wlthout an1 partlcular 
meanlng. What lilt then that Thomlsts talk about when they 
ule th1s word ·orltlque"? They cannot take 1t ln exaotly the 
lAZe sense lant understood 1t, because that would toroe them to 
beoome Kantlana all the way through. . Xet thel cannot take 1t i. 
an altogether d1tterent meaning elther. It has to remain a 
orltlque, a Judgment_ !herefore it 1s necessary that the stand 
po1nt from whlch the Judgment takes place Is not the same as It 
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conolusion, because otherwIse no real Judgment would be posslble 
41 
There must be a certain stage of suspension tirst, In which a 
decislon has not let been taken. A certain .·pttori element i. 
necessary. Without It there 1s no crItIque In the real sense of 
the word. 
Critioal reall •• cannot start wIth reallsm. It It dId 
lant would Justly prote.t and gay: "This 1s no real cr1t1que. 
The case has already been deoided betore the beg1nn1ng ot the 
Judgmen t. It 
... We arr1ve at the same dIlemma as In Le Reallsme 
---- ... 
M~thodigue. When one takes rea11sm as one's polnt ot departure, 
there is no real critlque, no unbiased Judgment; and when one 
takes a standpoint outside or pr10r to realism, it must be an 
14'a11&tio standpoint and one never will arrive at realism 
again. When cr1tioal reali.',s, assert that the atflrmatioDa ot 
realism reoelve a new and tirmer certitude after the or1tique, 
G11son asks whether th1. oert1tude was not lutfioient betore the 
oritical retlexion. It 1t was not, the critioal retlex10n oannot 
make it more eVident, beoause it on17 makes more olear what was 
already there 1n the or1g1nal aot ot the intelleot. Anl lack ot 
evidence 1n the aot ot the intelleot must atteot also the re-
tlex1on. For realists there oan be no other point of departu.re 
but rea11sm. Th1s makes a critIque imposs1ble. 
The diffioulty becoa.s the greater when we oonsider 
that realism here is supposed to be immed1ate rea11sm, i.e., a 
- 25 ::. 
realism whi$h protesses to attaln extramental reallty ~mmed~­
ately. How can an lntellect whioh immedlatel, grasps reallty 
ever take a posltion other than real1 .. , the real belng lta 
immediate obJeot? For immediate realis. a critique ot knowledg 
1s certainly an imposs1bility, even a oontrad1otion. The word 
1mmed1ate rea11sm excludes critlque • 
. 
G1lson concludes: MTherefore with all due deference 
to lts defendera, I perslst ln think1ng that the problem to tln 
a orit1cal reallsm 1s as contradlctary ln UlJelt as the notlon 
at a square clrole.- 1 
Thus the first thesl. seems to be proved: the orlt-
10al method used hI Thomlsts to establlsh the value ot lntel-
leotual knowledge must necessarll, lead to ldeal1sm, 1f lt 1s a 
real cr1tlque, 1.e., a Judgment ot the intellectual aotlvity. 
It 1t is not taken in the sense ot being a real Judgment lt ls 
no real crit1que. In that ease 1t 1s useles., beoause lt does 
not prove anythlng, and lt had better be avolded as a oontusing 
and misleading term. 
GILSON'S SEOOND THESIS 
Gilson'S second obJeotion against oritical realiam ls 
that it makes epistemology the tirst science and ln so dolng 
destroys the prlmacy ot the phllosophy whloh has being as lts 
1. ibid, pia 11 
obJeot, metaphys1os. Indeed most orltloal reallsts S8Y that 
epistemologt 1s the f1rst s01enoe and has to be treated as an 
introduotion to metaphySios. This ls naturtltrom their point 
ot v1ew. Metaphys1cs has as 1ts obJeot reality or beIng. It 
reaohes this realIty through the 1ntellect. But 1s lt not 
natural then, that a kInd ot invest1gation precedes to find out 
whether th1s Intelleot is really an instrument Bulted to know 
reality? 
Med1eval phllosophers ~ere never aware that this 
question could be raised. Their problem, the problem ot the 
un1versals 1s a problem among realiRts in the modern aense. 
Jo11vet writes about th1s: uThe medieval realists Opposed the 
nominal1sts 1n a field whioh 1s greatly different trom the one 
1n which the probl.- 1s raised toda1~ 1n taot, lt is not the 
lame problem whioh is treated; the Middle Ages have been pre-
Oooupied for a long time w1th the quest10n ot the nature ot the 
conoept. they never doubted that its oontent had been borrowed 
~rom the obJeot, and even les8 that the object really ex1sted.- 1 
~e1 took 1t tor granted that the obJeot ot the intellect was 
.xtramental real1ty. But onoe the quest10n has been raised br 
~omebod1 1n more modern times, then a large group ot scholast10 
ph1losophers belleve tl~t they can oonsider 1t ns a legitimate 
Uletion. When lt is a legltima.te question however, has not 
1. a.JOllv32et. Ad Tho.islle .!! .!! cr1tlgu,tt !! !! connalssanoe. p. • 
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the solution to be glven betore one proceeds to .etaphyslos? 
41 
This ls what Xsgr. Noil states ln hls Reallsma 
" !mmedlat: -There 1s no good .etaphyslcs without critical pro-
legomena, and lant, and betore hlm Descartes, taught phl1osoph, 
once and tor all, somethlng whloh constltutes an essential 
progress ot human thought-. l It is very olear where the.e 
modern scholastio crltloal realists got their lnsp1ratlon. 
For all modern ph1losophlcal s,.te.. the ep1eteaological problem 
1s tbe tirst problem to be lolved. Several never get any far-
ther. Should Thomlsta tollow their example? Is it possible 
to tollow thea w1thout renouno1ng St. Thom.s? 
G1lson th1nksilt is not. Hls doctrlne 1s very clear: 
-I contest the prlorlty ot epistemology ln regard to prlmac, 
phl10soph1 or .etaphyslos, wbl1e Msgr. Noel aftlrms that the 
ontologlcal theor, ot knowledge ls 10gloal17 posterior to 
eplste.olOg,·.2 Orl tlca~ .. rea11.a destroys the unoondl tlonal 
primacy ot metaphysloS. 3 It is a subverslon ot Thoalaa. 4 
The tirst obJeot ot the intellect is beingi the tirst 
lel.nce, theretore, must be the solenoe about being as being, 
whlch ls .etaphyslos. It starts with the oonoept ot belng and 
1 L. Noel, L! Reallsme Immediat, Louvain, 
1938, p. 23 - 24. 
" 2 Gl1son,Rea11sme Thomlste. p. 36 tootnote. 
Speclaiiy also p. 106 sq. 
3 ~,p. 106. 
• ~, p. 108. 
... 
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tbe tlrst ~lnolples whlch are nece,sary tor all sclenoe. 
No reallstlc pbl10sophy, 1.e., no phllosophy whloh holds that 
the tlrst buman knowledge ls the knowledge ot belng, oan 
devlate tram It. Hetaphyslos rurnlshes the base tor all tur-
ther solentltic knowledge and, theretore, Justly oocuples an 
unoondltlonal prlmaoy among th ••• 
At the tlme whloh saw the beglnnlng at modern 
phllo.ophles, however, the lntereat shitted trom belng to 
knowledge. The solenoe ot knowledge bec .. e more and more 
lmportant, but this emphasls obsoured the relatlon between 
knowledge and belng gradual11 and paved the wa, tor ldeallsm. 
Ketaphyslcs lost lts prlmaoJ among the solenoes, whloh went 
to the new scienoe ot knowledge. aeallsa dlsappeared and 
lde.118m took lts plaoe. 
!he crltloal reallsts do not see. to be aware that 
reall •• lmplies tbat metapb,aloa 1s tbe tirat solenoe. Puttlng 
up another solenoe betore .etaph,81c8 1, to torsake real1sm. 
Another notlon oomes betore the notlon at belng, the notlon ot 
thought. Instead at 11n the beglnnlng was belng~ 00lle8 ·In the 
beSlnnlng was thought' but-thls lmp11.s abandonlng reall ... 
It anythlng, then reall_ ls the herltage ot ,~ and that 
11 oertalnl, the reason wh, Gl1son calls orltlcal reallsm an 
Overthrow ot St. Thomas. 
Bot only ls metaphyslos, the 801ence at belng, the 
t1rlt at solenoes, lt also has the prl.aoJ .. ong thea. It 11 
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the solenoe Jlt the f1rst prlnciples and the tlrst causes. 
All other sc1ences have to use Its concluslons; all depend 
on It. 
Acoordlng to the orltlcal realllt., hovever, 
metaphysios itself becomes d.pendent on epist •• olog,. Epls-
te.olog, Judges it. XetaphTslcs onll becomes a legltimate 
sclenoe when Its legittaacl haa been proved bl the crItical 
exam1nation ot eplsteaolol7. Iplstemolol7 dec14 •• vhether or 
not It Is posslble to have a .etaphyslos. That aeans that 
•• taph,slcs, the queen of sol.nces, bas been dethroned bl 
eplst_ology or that reall111 hal b •• n abandoned. 
Moreover, what klnd ot princlples 18 eplst •• olog, 
golng to us. In thla examination it not principles ot 
---
metaphysl0.' B1 ahovlng back aetaph,sics, ho.ever, to a 
aeoond place, It bas no r1ght to use thea. 100041 has the 
right to use sclentlf10 prlnclples betore thelr so1entlf10 
Talue has been eltabllshed. 
Thus explal.'led In lapl. and clear t.nas. the oon-
tradictlon ot crltloal real1 .. 11 apparent, 10 apparent In 
taot that one can hal'dl1 belleve that Ita adherents do not 
•• e It. They have, however, a oerta1n vague and contused va, 
ot eXposlng the1r d.octrlne. about wh1ch Gl1son complalns; 
ao~,oTer the, are conv1nced that there must be a wa, to conquer 
14'alla. wlthout supposing the opposlte; as 1t were fro. 1ns1de. 
... 30 ... ~ 
To thls la8t charg', that crltlcal reall_ would 
41 
make metaphyslos subordlnate to eplstemology, crltloal 
reallsts have an answer. They say that the relatlons between 
epistemology and metaphysios are mutual. Eplstemology tlrst 
establlshes metaphyslcs as a legitlmate selence, but onoe 
estab11shed, metaphyslos beoomes tbe tlrst ot all sclence. 
and Jutges thea all, a180 epistemolog, under lt8 aspeot ot 
treatlng abOut being. 'nowledge oert81nl, talls under the 
laws ot belng, but the tirst examlnatlon ot knowledge must be 
1nstltuted trom a standpolnt whlcb ae Bolland Gosselln say., 
'ls outslde every •• taphysloal presuPPositlon·. l 
Ultimatel, thls second objection ot G1leon agalnst 
orlt10al reall_, that lt destroys the uncondltional prlmaey 
ot metaphysics, has the aame ground as h1. tirst. Thle .econd 
thesls can be brought back to the same 41leama .e saw at the 
2 end ot the expos1tlon of the tirst one. 
It the tlrst prinolple ls belng-- whlch atter all 
18 at least posslble--, enl est quod prlao cadlt ln 
lntellectu,- every state.ent at once laplles 'he --
aff1rmation of belng, and dec1d.s the quest10n ln favor 
ot rea11sm. It on the contrary a separate d1sclpllne 
can be formed without poslt1ng belng, thought, not 
belng, 18 the t1rst princlple. In that case, the ques-
tlon 18 decided 1n favor ot 1deal1sm. But 1n e1ther 
lnstance, the dec1s10n has alread7 beea a.de. 
1 ~, p. 110. 
2 lbid, p. 112. 
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Gllson reproaches orltlcal reallsts tbat they go 
too tar ln adaptlng Thomls. to modern phllosophles. Whlle 
thelr purpose ls to oonform Thomasts perennlal truth to modern 
tlmes, the, seem not to reallze that lnstead ot promotlng lt 
they rather endanger what lsprlmary ln lt, 1.e., 1ts reallsm. 
It ls a slgn that modern thought has been profoundly oontam-
lnated and corrupted bl lant's'orlt1que, that outstanding 
Thomlsts do not see the 1mpllcatlons ot a non-reallstic stand-
polnt at the entrance ot ph1losoph,. The endeavours to retute 
ldeal1sm by uslng lts own method must oertalnl, be pra1sed. 
But the thlng Just can't be done. It 11 lmposs1ble. Though 
many answers have been g1ven by Thomlsts slnce the beglnn1ng 
of neo-scholastlo1sm", none ot them have proved to be satla-
taetory. They elther water down thelr crltlque 10 that thel 
only seem to use the same met~od &s ldeallsts whereas the, 
really do not, or they have a real crltlque but beoome 
entangled ln many lnsoluble problems. Crltlcal reall .. mlsses 
the clarlty whlch ls a characterlstlc ot Thoml.-, as lt ls a 
oharacterlstic ot truth. Th1s might have led 1ts detenders 
to a susplc10n ot 1t8 lawfulnels. 
There aust, therefore, be another answer to ldeall_ 
&Ad another way out ot the probl.. ot knowledge. Tbese are 
Gllson's conclusions ln the negatiT. part ot R'alls •• l.hom1a!e. 
-~-
OHAPTER II 
AN ESTIMATE OF GILSON'S CRITICISM 
If G1lson ls correct 1n his or1t1clsm, modern Thomlea 
1s sufter1ng from a serlous malady. Alaolt the wbole ot lt 
would seem to be lnfected wlth the dlsease ot ldeallsm. And 
that 11 exaotly what Gllson sa,s. In hls preface to Real1 ... 
Thomlste, he apeaks of fhom1s~'as present.d by some aodern 
Thomlats, as belng In 'a state of advanced decompolltlon-. l 
Although he applles th1s phrase of the 1ntroduct1on only to 
oertaln modern Thomiata,2 the body ot the book makea clear 
that lt applles, ln Gilson's thinklng, to the leaders ot 
oontemporary fhoml.m. Crltical reallsm ls, acoordlng to 
Jollvet,a the oommon teachlng ot Thomlsta today. Certalnly. 
they use the word 'orltlque- freely, qu1te unaware, 1t would 
8eem, of lts dangerous lmpllcatlons. As Gl1son puts 1t, 
4 
'they are playing w1th dynam1t.'. 
Thom1stlc th1nkers are by no means lntalllble, not 
even as a whole. But lt ls dlttlcult to belleve that they, al 
a group, would have tallen into the serlous blunder ot wblob 
1 !B!!, p. 7. 
2 ~, p. 7 
3 R. Jo11vet, Le Thoml ... et la Orltlque !! !! Oonna1ssance, Parll, 1933, p. I§. -- --
~ • E. Gl1son aeall .. e fhoallte et Critlque 
~!! Connallsanoe, p. 67. --
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Gl1son aoouae. them, and then perslated In the same blunder 
41 
tor almost 50 years, teachlng It In the1r sohools and devel-
oplng 1t 1n their ·orltlques ot knowledge-, whlle all rthe tl.e 
none ot them was aware ot the tact that he was undermlnlng 
Thoml88 lnstead ot promotlng it. Noreover, Gl1son'. orltlclsm 
Is nelther 80 subtle nor so profound that It could po.albll 
have eacaped\olear thlnkera. 
He hlmselt says that It surprises hlm that it dld, 
and he thInks the realon Is that fhomlsts were too preoccupIed 
wlth defendlng realls. agalnst Ideallsm In a way acoeptable to 
Ideall.t8. Thelr eagerness must have made them lose slght ot 
the danger. 
The faots are, however, tbat Thomlsts have always 
been aware ot the danger ot Idealls.. A study ot eplste.olo-
glea made at least professedl, ~ .ent .. ~ Thomae, suoh as 
Van Rlet's ~tEplstemolosle Thoml.te, shows that the, bee ... 
gradually more purifled of dangeroul elements, whlch they 
oertalnly contalned In thelr early stages. 
In the flrst stage Thomlst. adapted 'he.selves too 
.uch to Idea11stl0 posltlons. Thel started trom an Ideallst10 
POint of departure, or they Invoked the prlnolple ot causallty 
l1ke Desoarte.,l to arrIve at reallty. But the.e were the 
tlrst hesItant attempts of a phI1080pn, searchIng tor a solut1on 
-
1 e. gr. Oardinal MercIer, aeinstadler, 'r1ok 
- M-
to a new probl ... 
41 
Eventually, the suspect el •• ents were 
ellmlnated, and Thoml88 tound the proper approach to the 
eplstemologlcal probl_. Though all the Thomlstlc eolutlo1l8 
to the 'plstemologlcal problem are not identloal, all have 
a substant1al unity. In thelr ma18 polnte, 1.e., thelr 
.ethode (crltlcal approach) and concluslon. (1 ... 41at8 reall .. ), 
. 
m08t Thomlsts today are ln oomplete agr •••• nt. 
Properly to •• aluate &11aon's critlclsm, we aust 
know exactll what h. und.retands bl 'crltlque'. Accordlng to 
h1s understandlng at the term, 1t cannot be reoonciled wlth 
real1811l. The two worde are not compatible. "Crltioal. 
reall .. • 1s a oontradlctlon 1n teras. l 
But 'orltlque- 18 not .. e&s, word to dttlr.., Glleon 
2 
saY8. However, lt lt means anything, it aust mean a o.rt~n 
Judgment. The gre.k word, lade.d, .ean. Ito Judg., to 4.01de 
1n a cau.e, to.dlsoern'. In eplsteaologr. theretore, 1t must 
.ean, to pronounoe a Judgment on the aotlvltl ot the lntelleot 
or on human knowledge ln g.neral. A Judpent, however, has 
no value lt the Judge ls preJudloed, lt he has alread, deolded 
beforehand what he ls golng to 8a,. All the 'e.tlmonl •• ot 
defendants and the pleas ot lawyers are u.eles8 ln tbat oa8e. 
-
1 I. Gl1son, R.,llsme fhoalste J! Crltlgv! !! l! Conna1ssanoe, p. 77. 
2 !\)14 , P. 41. 
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Such a Judgment ls not a Judgment; lt i. onl1 a tarce. 
In human knowledge •• have the .ame oa... Elther we 
take a. our polnt ot departure reall .. , but then the orltlque 
has already been deolded betorehand &ad la no lIore than a taroe, 
or .e take a point ot departure prior to reall... In that o..e 
we have a real orltique, but .e wl1l neTer agaln arrlTe at 
realiBII. 
!he very word orltlque lmplles a point ot d.pariure 
other than and prior to its tera. It the term 18 reall •• , tbe 
p01nt ot departure, theretor., aust be an 1deal18tl0 one. 
Is thls detinltlon ot crltlque as an a priorl JudgBent 
ot the Talue ot human knowledge the onl7 posslble one' Speak-
lng ot Gilson'. ep18t .. o10g,,1 R. Verneaux polnta out that 
there are various other klnds ot oritique, a. lit,rar, orltlque, 
muslcal crltiqu., mllltar, crltlque, .to. In all tbe., oOllblna-
tions the word 'critique- Indioate. a crltloal •• tlaat.. It 
does not .ee. to lap1, that a prlori ,lea.nt whl0h Gllaon 
atre.ses. Verneaux wanta, theretore, to a •• the critloal 
approach malntalnet. 
To thls Gilson oertalnl, would answ.r that 1n thea, 
oo.blnatlona the quest10n 1e a qult. 41tterent one. In the 
O.a. ot llterary or1tique, e.g., 1t 11 a18 .. e4 thai 'bere are 
-
C 1 Etlenne .11.oa, Phllosophe !! lA 
_ht-etlente, p. 223. 
.----------------------------------------~~-~------------------~ 
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11terary Vatuel. These are h1tel'l as a oriter10n or rule to 
tind out whether a given work ot literature or aft author haa 
any value ln that tleld and how auoh. In the ca.e of a 
orltlque ot knowledge, however, no\hlng haa been e.tablishe' 
yet. The questlon is about the .,ery tlrst Judeaent abou' 
human knowledge, to t1nd out whether 1t haa any value or not 
. 
in regard to a pOIs1ble extr .. ental world. Xn .uch a JUd,..nt 
nothing oan be presuPpo8e4. It oertaln11 cannot a.suae the 
truth ot a realism whloh 1t 18 asked to e.tabll.h. 
Onoe the value ()t hUllan knowledge hal b •• n e.tabll.hed 
there 11 rooa tor orit1que to d.terml.e the varlou. degr •• a ot 
value ot the 41tterent kind. ot knowledge. Gl1aon agre •• wlth 
that. He SarlH 'aeall •• does not retusl a C'rltlqul ot 
iDc"ledge!, on the contrary lt accepts lt, 1t aata tor 1t; 
but 1 t retuee. any .! pr10£1 01"1 tlque ot knowledge _.1 !h1e 
01"1 tlque ot the 41tterent k1ndl of knowledge to de'era.lne 
thelr degre.e 'ot value ln atta1n1ng extr ... ntal reallt, can 
be oOllpared with l1terary, mUl1cal, alUtaPJ orltique.e'o., 
but the t1rst crltlque oertalnl, cannot. 
Ifeverthele.. the que.tlon can be asked, whether a 
01"1 tlque ot knowledge, because 1 t must be an lapal'tl&l Judg-
•• nt, cannot .tart trom real1_. ,A Jud,. wbo 1aGoav1noed. 
-
" ..-1 E. Gl1.on, Jd Healllme •• y!!d1De, p. 81. 
r 
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ot the lnnooeno. or gul1t ot a part, oan atl11 pronounoe a 
<II 
perteot1, 1.partlal Judgaent. It all dependa on whether he 
lets hls prevlous oonvlctlon play a part ln hls Judga.nt or 
not. It hll d.01810n ls alread, lIade betor.hand, and he la 
determlned tQ stlok to lt, whatever evldeno. ma, b. brought 
torth bl detendant or law,er, hls 1. oertaln11 not an 1.partlal 
. 
Judgment. But a Judge, on the other hand, who, although he 
ls oonvlnoed ot the lnnooeno. ot the det.ndant, ls prepared to 
11st.n to all the .vldeno. that wl11 be brought torth agalnst 
h11l and to pa.s hls a.ntenoe aooordlng to lt, oannot be 
reproaohed tor belng partlal. 
The orltlqu. ot knowl.dge se ••• to provlde a st.l1ar 
oa.e. Although a Thomlstlc philosopher ls a realist, lt he 
dOls not let hl. reall .. lntlueno. hls lnvestlgatlon, but 1. 
prepared to aooept the result ot an i.partlal Judgaent, his 
.ee •• to be a p.rt.ctly acoeptable orltlque. 
Startlng thls lnvestlgatlon he ls a r.a11st, but not 
qua philosopher. Hls ls the rea11 .. ot the common man ln ever, 
4&7 11te, whloh 1. oertaln1r not phl10sophloal1, tounded. It 
18 the .... oas. as wlth the Judge, who ls startlng wlth a 
ooaplet.17 open mlnd qua Judg.. In the refleotlon It •• 1t, the 
philosopher as a phl10sopher do.s not -suppose aD7th1ng, not 
even r.al1 .... 1 H1s lnitlal attitude 11 'outllde the plan ot 
-
P. 64_ 
1 L. loel. R.vu •• eo,oolastlgu., 1940, 
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ph1losoph1o,1 researob·. l Phl1o.oph1call, speakIng it is a 
hJpothe.1s tor hla. 
All fhoml.ta ,tre.s the Deoel81tr ot thl. lapar-
tlalltl. Thus Van Steenberghen 8&,S 1n hls Eplste.oloSl: 
'Ep1ste.ologr Is an objective and 41al.tere,ted Inqu1rl; It 
.tud1e. the nature, oond1tion. and value ot knowledge wlthout 
. 
deoid1ng betorehand what the re.ult. and consequence. ot 1t. 
stud7 vl11 b. I .! 
Mons1gnor Noel writ.s in the sam. strain when h. 
deflne. the purpose ot tbe orltloal .ethod a.: 
'To tr, to glve to ph1losoph, an Inoontestable 
polnt ot departure, on the matter ot wh1ch no further 
questlon oan be asked; tbe cr1tloal .ethod retuses no 
questlon and dlspense. wlth all pre.uppos1tlons. 
'Radioal 81noerlt,' 18 neoessarl to oppoae thl. 
attItude to the one whloh haa been praet1.ed by 80 
manr dogmasllstle slsteas, vhloh aat that there be 
forbldden question. and whioh tr1 to iapo.e upon tht 
mind the acoeptatlon of lndllputable preJudgaent.·. 3 
The orltlcal .ethod dlapen.ea witb all presuppos1-
tlons", means that 1t starta wlth the taot of hUllan knowledge 
wlthout anything else. On the exl.tenoe of buaan knowledge 
t.erybod, agreea. Inve.tlgatlng this knowledge the or1tlcal 
•• thod retuses &Dy 1nterferenoe tro. whataoeYer. It doe. not 
.tart w1th a oertain deflnition of that knowledge. It neither 
a •• erta that It exolude. real1tl (the Ideall1t10 pOlltion) 
-
19~ • 134. 
1 ~, p. 41. 
2 Van Steenbergh,n, 121It",,<:,1017, p. 21. 
3 L. Joel, ~ Reallsme Iamedlat, Louvaln, 
.. 39 -
nelther tba~ lt lnclud •• lt (the d018atl0 posltlon) but take. 
buman knowledge slspl, a8 1t presents ltselt, with a totall, 
unbla.ed slnA. 
Acoording to Mar1taln the orltloal queatlon 18: 
'Whl1e thougbt presenta lta.lt trom the flrat .a guaranteed 
by reallt, (as8uree sur les cho.e.) and .e.sured b7 an .s.e 
-. 
lndependent ot thought It.elt, how 18 one to Judge lt, how, 
under whlch oondltions and 1n what meaaure lt 1s that wa".l 
Rolland Go.sa11n apeaks 1n the a.e wlae: 'Orltlque 
wl11 take aa matter ot lta exulnatlon knowledge as lt prea.nts 
ltselt 'pontaneous11. lt wl1l stu41 thla knowledge 1n the tree 
plal ot 1t. develop.ant but wl11 re.erve the que.tlon ot lta 
value tor a phllosophloal retlexlon'.! 
The, all accept as their startlng pOint knowledge aa 
l' present. It.elt, that 18 knowledge whloh 1. about extra-
.ental thlngs, but thel' all atrea. the neoesslty ot 1mpartlal-
lt, and obJeotlvlt, ln the orttloal axaalnatloA. Inowledge.s 
1t pre.ent. It.elt 18 reallatl0. fbi. ls the reall .. ot the 
aan on the street, the unphl10sophlcal or nalve .e.ll ... 
tllson'. orltlcl. wo\lld be; how oan lt be a real 
4IQoftatratlon ot reallsa 1t the polnt ot departure 18 alrea4J 
.eallatlc' How oan a real1stlc pOlnt ot departure ever b. 
-
1 J. Karl taln, Le. Degree. du Savor, Parl.,1932, 
P. 142 (trad. The Degree. ot lnowl,c1Re, iiew'o'rk, 1938,., p. 89. 
S H. Rolland QOss.lld; I •• ~ ~ I!! £tuQa 
Sr1tlgue ~ !! Oonnal.sance, Par1" 1932, p. 14. 
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called an i~artlal or obJeotive one? 
The answer to the tlrst questlon 18 that there is DO 
real demonstratlon 1n the sense ot a deaonatratlon whlch oan be 
put ln a syllogism. The value ot knowledge oannot be proved 
that way. The or1tloal realists agree on that. 'aealism oannot 
be demonstrated', says Msgr. Iioel. l 
. 
The critioal investigation whlob takes plaoe by .eans 
of retlexion 18 nothing els_ and cannot be anrth1na el.e than 
a becoming consclous of som.thing whloh already vas there, and 
ot whlch the 1ntelleot vas air_ad, somewhat oonsolous ln a 
vague and \UDsclentltl0 wa,. 
Everybody knows that lntellectual knowledge reveals 
truth about extramental things. the lntelleot prelents its 
knowledge as such. This is the knowledge ot the ordinary .an. 
He is consolous that he knows extramental thlngl. But this ls 
not a sOientiticall, founded knowledge. Se never exaain_4 it. 
And in taot, it might happen, that, when he •• t an 1deallst 
who showed hl. the dltflcultles tbat arise trom thlnking that 
knowledge deals with the extraaental world, he would start 
doubting whether it doe. 10 at all. Theretore, philosophers 
Itart an impartial and obJeotive examinat10R ot 'hls ooaon 
oonlciousness 1n order to investlgate it there il real11 a 
toundation tor it. 
-
,. ".. " 1 L. Noel, !t! fl!all .• I ... d;at, p. 27. 
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Hoel put lt very clearly ln a leoture be gave at the 
<II 
Sixth Internatlonal Congress tor Philosophy at Harvard ln 1926. 
MEvery Judgment implles a comparlson between thought 
and thlngs. It also 1mplle. an eleaentary retlexlon 
whioh makes that comparison and toraulates lta 
results. £plstaaology has nothing aore to do than 
to retraoe ln expllclt and technioal te~s the steps 
ot that elementarT retlexlon·. l --
fhe affirmatlon that ~he Intelleot attains reality 
is always there but lt Is not a crltioalll examlned atflrmatlon. 
As a basis for solenoe or philosophy It Is useless. It oan 
easily be shaken by doubt. Solentltlcalll oonalder.d, lt 1. 
no more than an hypothesls. Another hypothesl. Is 14eal1811. 
When an examinatlon has been Instituted, this examlnation bl 
way of a reflex10n shows that the tormer popular conviotion 
was right. Atter thls oritloal retleXlon the atflraatlon 1. 
detlnlte and prov1des a sound base for further speoulatlon. 
Durlng all the tlae of the or1tlcal Inv.atlgatlon the 
phllosopher remalns oerta1n ot reall .. , but thla cert1tude la 
outslde h1a phllosoph1cal Inqulrl, aa loel expla1ns 1n hia 
anever to G1lson. It ls a natural and instlnotlve oertitud. 
or an attachaent to tradItIon, but phllosophicall, .e mal be 
~d to be not oertaln. S Solentltloall, we may sar thatthere 
1. doubt. 
-
1 lbl~, p. 273 
,/ 
2 ReV)l.f .eo!-Soo:tastl9!" 1940,p. 51 
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Sp.ce prevents U8 trom treatlng extenslvel, this 
question ot doubt, but nevertheless we must s.y somethlng 
about it, as 1t is intimatel1 connected wlth this lmpartlal 
attitude at the beginnlng ot the epistemological question. 
Some authors indeed mean nothing els8 by thelr doubt 
than thil obJectlvity or lmpartlallt1 to be observed ln the 
lnvestigatlon. Magr. Farges define. hls doubt as "a mere 
abstainlng trom takIng sldes ln order to make our examinatlon 
absolutely iapartIal M• 1 
thIs brlnglng ln ot the term 'doub'- may have be.n 
mleleading and have caused the lmpresslon that the, borrowed 
more from ldeallstl than they actuall, 414. !be tera -doubt' 
.oreover underwent quite a leries ot ohanges in ltl use by 
fhomistlc eplatemologlsts, and we do not Waftt to prove that lt 
d1dnot have, at least in BO •• ot thea, a greater element ot 
ldeallstl0 thought than waa Justlfiable 1n a reallstiC 
phl1osoph,. 
However, doubt or no doubt, tbe impartlallty of the 
investlgatlon waa the thlng that realY counted, and doubt m&7 
have been stressed too much Just because ot the importance ot 
'he objectivity. There val a tlme when the question ot doubt 
·'.med to be the all lmportant question ot ep1steaolog1, and 
tountless were the oontr1but1ons wr1tt.n about It. Nov 
'aQ Rlat'8 oanalualon is that the question ot doubt 1s 8. mere 
-------------------1 Van Ri." Ip18tamo10118, p. 232. 
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questlon of words whloh has held too long the attentlon ot 
<It 
the Thomlstl0 eplstemologlsts and whlch would deserve to be 
detlnltel, dropped trom crltlcal d180us810ns-. l 
The maln polnt ls that thls crltlcal .xamlnatlon, 
though lt ls not a demonstratlon ln the strlot sen8e of the 
word, nevertheleas, proves reallsm bT way ot a retlexlon, 
maklng lt a 801entltloally Just1fled oonvlotion. The reflexlon 
ls "81noe the tlme of Plato and Arlstotle a 01a8s1cal prooedure 
of solentlflc lnQUlrr,.2 It ls a real Judgment ot what take. 
plaoe ln onets oonsolousnes8 ln order to detera1ne the valldlt, 
of knowledge. 
Gllson sAJS ln hls a'all .. e Thoa18te that not everT 
retlexlon has to be orltlcal and that Ksgr. Joel ls wrons ln 
lupposlng that lt doe.: "It 1. certaln17 a poor orltlque, which 
CODslsts ln the becomlng oon.olous ot the taot, that what was 
lamedlatel, evldent tor tbought, was lndeed 1 .. edlate17 
eVldent l .! Gl1son bere over.laplltle. the teacblng ot the 
orltloal reallsts. The retlexlon doe. 40 so.etblng more, vlz. 
1t ls a real Judgment on the value ot knowledge, and glve. a 
lolentlflc ba.e to reall... Because ot tbat 1t can be r1ghtl, 
Oalled a crltlque. It oerta1n11 contlrms the reall .. ot the 
la'elleotual act, but thls oontlrmatlon 1. not Juat a alaple 
-
1 ~,p. 637 - See al.o p. 338 
2 Van Steenberghen, ipiateaoloSl, p. 32 
,/ 3 E. Gl110n, Reall ... Thoal.te, p. 75 
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repetltlon. ~It ls a sclentlflc Judgment, and ralses knowledge 
to a hlgher level, sakes lt an approprlate ba.e tor .eta-
ph1s1cal speculation. 
The phl1osopher does not have to take tor his or1tlcal 
lnvestlgatlon the .ere conoept, abstract1ng tro. lts relatlon 
to reallty. The oonoept as suoh 11 not that whlch the slnd 
natural11 presents to UI. The 1ntellect alwa1s presentl It. 
knowledge as the knowledge of soa.thlng; at the .aa.tl.e that 
the concept ls prelented, reallt1 11 'presented ln the ldea. 
As St. fhomal sa1s: 
'Speolel lntell1g1bl1e., qulbul lnte11eotus 
pOlslbl1l. tlt ln aotu, noa BUnt obJectua 
18telleotu8. Non enl. Ie habent ad lnt8l1ectua 
slout quod lntell1g1tur, le4 810ut quo lntell1g1t. 
Manlfestua elt 8nla quod lalentl ... unt de his 
quae lntellectul lntelllg1t. auat aute.lclentlas 
de rebus, non del speClebus, vel lntentlonlbus lnt8111g1b11bu8. .. 
The oonoept al suoh wlthout that relatlon ls so.ethln, wh10h 
hal already been worked upon; lt 1s not the tlrs' datua. The 
oonoept as suob ls, theretore, not an lapartlal or obJeotlve 
po1nt ot departure tor a or1t1cal examlnation. The natural 
data ot the lntelleot have alread1 been lnterpreted b1 the 
.1nd. The mlnd i8 no longer an unblased observer and lnter-
preter of what the lntellect presents to 1t. 
The obJeot ot examlnation ls the oonoept al lt 
prleents ltselt, w1th 1tl whole oontent. But the oonoept 1. 
- 1 St. Thomas l! ~lb. AI ftn1ma, III, lect.8 
~--------------------------------~---,---------,--------------~ 
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nothlng elae than la thlng In us'. IIts tlrst 01&1.· as 
Marltaln sa,s, "1s to be nothlng else but the thing Itselt, 
the extr .. ental belng, the ontologlcal object, transporte4 
Into us l • l Spontaneousl, ever, Intellect ls real18tl0. We 
oould not take anotber startlng polnt wlthout oea81ng to be 
obJectlve. 'The thlng Is glven at the same t1me a8 the object 
and througb lt, and 1t 18 absu~ to vant to separate Itl.2 
Thls does not mean, however, that we already are 
sure ot the results ot our Inqulr7 at the bellnnlng. Our 
startlngpolnt ls tbe reallstlo one, but our conoluslon alght 
theoretloall, vell be Ideallstlc, as far as our Inltlal 
attltude 18 conoerned. Other oonslderatlons ma, prove the 
lmpos81bll1t, ot It. What ve want to .t,.es8 ls that ve 40 
not prejudge the caa.. There Is no preJudlce whatsoever .. 
to the result. of the lnqulry. The, depend on what tbe 
er1tlcal examlnatlon shovs us. The result of the Investlgatlon 
vl1l be the tacta that ve tlnd the initlal and Ipontaneous 
rea11sm ot our intellect reall, Justltled. Atter the retlex-
lon ve know e!eliclte and ~n ~ctu s119ato vhat ever, act ot 
the Intellect teaohes U8 iapllclte and exero1t~.3 
-
1 J. Karltaln, a'flexlons !B! l' Ifttelllgenoa, 
Parls, 1930, p. 42. 
2 J. Marl t&in, !:e.!! Degreel !! Savor t p. 181 
3 Oh. BOJer, Cu.sus Phl1osophlcus, I, p. 113 
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I~t 01'11, 18 the reallstl0 polnt 01' departure not a 
partlal one, but lt appear8 the 01'11, tapartlal one. The 
ldeallst. are the on •• who oorrupted the questlon b7 devlatlng 
trom the orlg1nal data. 
thomlstic crltlcal reall .. otters a 'true and com-
plete apolog, tor knowle4ge, whlch founds a reall_, not a 
. 
nalve reallsm, nor a neoor paleo-reall .. , but the e •• mal 
reall_, eternal 11ke truth It.elt'," 
fhi. retlexloD also se •• s to be a real Judgment. 
Although the Judge hl •• elt ls a reallst, he ls, howe"er, 
read, to glve up hl. real!&a lt the lnqulry lead8 hla to It. 
,. 
Belng a reallst I!t.ght lead h1a to In,,lnclble dlttlcultl.s; 
1 t mlght aake knowledge alto.gether lnoomprehenslble. He 
wants to lnstltute an unblased lnvestlgatlon. The lntelleot 
tel18 hlm that lt talks about extr .. ental reallt7, but ls th1s 
801 Could not lt be that thls was an elluslon? Indeed manl 
.erlous phllosophers, 80.e 01' them atter a lltetlme ot 8tud7, 
thlnk lt ls. Are the7 wrong? !his 18 what the phllosopher 
wants to tlnd out. Theretore, he wants to examlne the aotl"lt7 
ot the lntelleot and pronounce a Judgaent. It ls, theretore, 
a real crltlque, a real Judgment. fhls word crltlque 11 not 
aore or lesl aeaningless ln Thomlstlc crltical rea11 .. , a. 
111101'1 seems to hold. 
Far trom uslng the word cr1tlque on17 or maln17 tor 
apologet1cal reasons, the Thomistlc crltical real1sts use lt 
r 
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In the •• anlng It had tlr,t In 1de.ll,tl0 thlAkers, 1.e., In 
the aeanlng ot an lapartlal Judpent ot hUJIara knowledge. fhe, 
tMIlk that thls crltlque ls a good el.ent In Ideall_ and In 
taklng It and Incorporatlng In Into thoals. the, belleve ~he, 
are contr1butlng towards tho progress ot fhoal.. 'lbo, think 
that Gllson t • 41et_! He who start. wlth lant or De.carte, Is 
bound to end up vith lant or De.oartes 18 onlf partlall, 'rue. 
Ideallsts 11k. all other philosophers are notwronl all the 
wa, through. Among thea are .0.' ot the mo.t g1tted ph11oso-
phers ot all times. There o,rtalnl, are elements 1n thea 
whlch can be u •• d. 
Hodern Thomlsts, aoreover, are aware ot the danger 
lurklng In a questlon whloh concern. tbe valldlt, It.elt ot 
phl10soph" a danger more serlous here than In other branohe. 
ot phl1osoph7. A mlsstep, the In •• rtlon ot a wron, prInolple 
would endanger the llte ot philosoph7 ltselt. And not onlr 
that, but It would have consequences tor revelatlon as well. 
Stl11 the, th1nk that Desoarte. and lant made thelr 
oontrlbution to the evolutlon ot hUllan tbought, that the, 
brought so.ething Ink phllosoph" whlob had not been there be-
tore, whioh may glve man a tuller understandlng ot truth. And 
although it did not do so in the syete.s ot Desoartes and lant 
'heaselv8s, becaus. lt vas mlxed wlth too .uch error, stl1l the 
element Is there. And vhile the1r own .,steml onl, show 
t'tleleneles and tailure, their true greatness appears 1n 
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fhomlsm whe» thelr contrlbutlons are used tor the fuller 
unfolding ot truth. As Msgr. Noel says: 'Desoartes and Kant 
once and tor all taught phllosoph1 sGaething wblch oonstltute. 
1 
an essentlal progress ot huaan though'-. 
Take the case ot Descartes. Undoubtedl, he 18 the 
Father ot modern Xaeallsm. As Glleon polnts out, 14eallam 
. 
was born on the da, when he decided that the math .. atlcal 
method should be tbe •• thod ot Ph11osoJ)h1. 2 !he IIlathe.atlcal 
method prooeeds trom thought, not trom reallt,. It abstracts 
trom concrete reallt,. B1 taklng thIs .ethod, theretore, 
Descarte. loosened the bond ot thought wlth realIt, and tbe 
gap wblch was thus opened between rea11ty and thought was ~ 
grow wlder and wlder. Inste.d Of taklng .a his poInt ot 
departure that wltb whlch and In whlcb was the obJect 1s gIvan, 
the natural presentatlon ot the lntellect, he tirst .evered 
thought trom 1 t. obJect and then made this artltioial stat_ent 
hls polnt ot departure. 
Thls 1s the mtstake ot D.soartes. But this has ' 
nothing to do wlth the questlon as suoh. Desoart •• was rlght 
1n asklng the quest10n whether the Intelleot vas an 1nstJ"WIent 
tlt to attaln truth. In h1s tlm., the perlod ot deollne ot 
loholast10 phllosoph7, there certaln17 s •••• to have been 
l'eaaon to put the questlon. ae was r1ght 1n look1ng tor aft 
-
1-
1 L. 10"1, .&! !fal1e.a X_edtat, p. 23. 
2 E. Gl1eon, The Un1t: of Phllosophical 
New York, 193 p. ch:-TII. -- --
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lnoontestable polnt ot departure tor •• tap1'l,81cal speculatlon. 
<II 
ae oould have been rlght, alao, ln taklng ~oglto as his polnt 
ot departure, thoug1'1 ln his assertlon that the qOil~! ls the 
only lawtul polnt ot departure, hi. error alread, beeo_e • 
• &nltest. Reallt7 18 1.plled ln eyery thought, not onl, 1n 
-., 
the thought whloh has the lelt a8 lt8 obJeot. But De.oarte. 
-~--~' .--., 
. 
had a wrong no~!ollt ot thought and, therefore, he put a 
legltlaate questlon the wrong wa,. 
Hls aathematloal preoooupation had made hi. 108. 
the natural notl~n of knowledge, tor 'knowledge 
as lt appears immediatel, to ltselt 11 oons010tte-
ness •• 1s an act whioh 18 domlnated by an object. 
It 18 an aotlvlty marked by:reoeptivlt, and even 
b11passivlt7. It ls a splrltu __ ~ oonsolousness 
wh1eh, through \ CO tpo .... l organs, openl 011 a 
corporeal vor141. 
For De8cartes~novledge ls not open, lt 18 closed. 
Stlll, as Noel expla1ns, ln h1s tlrst work he s.ems to have 
bad another notlon. There he speaks about thought contalning 
1'&allt,.2 In thls early stage hl. crltloal inqulry would 
have led h1m to a reallstic phllosophy. But graduall, thought 
and reallt, grew tarther and farther apart. In th1s stage 
there was 10glcall, no escape trom 1deall ... 
The fault ls not 1n h1s questlon, whlch was a l8g1t-
laate one but 1n hie try1ng to solve 1t from a prejudiced polnt 
-
1 Van Ste.nberghen, £platemol0!l, p. 147. 
2 L. loel, Le Realls.e Imme41at, p. 43-46, 
whel'& we tind a substantlal oll'itIoft trOll !Seloar' •• , anal,.ed bJ Msgr. lioel. 
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ot vlew. Tn. questlon oan be 801ved by one who app~oache. 
lt ln an unbia.ed way, taklng thought wlth what lt laplles, 
the obJeot. -Not even tor one moaent does the orltla! reallst 
tace oertltude. whloh mlght be purel, subJectlve, 1.e., wlthout 
an obJeot,.l "-'. 
In Desoartes we aust dlstlngulsh that ln whloh he 
was rlght tro. that 1n whloh he was wrong. It does not se •• 
neoessary to borrow the wrong with the rlght. Orltloal r.allstl, 
thought some ot the. went too tar 1n the beglnn1ng, th1nk that 
they oan ra1se h1s quest10n, about the valld1ty ot huaan know-
ledge, wlthout glvlng the .... anavar, beoaus. the answer val 
not oauled by the questlon but by approaohlng lt 1n a pre-
Judlced wa,.". 
Though we should not torget the enoraous 4aaage: 
Desoart.s lnfllcted upon .odern phlloloph1 ln belng the trall-
blazer ot ldeall .. , we oan also agree wlth Noel when he lay.: 
'We believe that Descartes rendered a real .ervloe to the 
2 progress ot thought·. 
What 1. true ot De.oarte. ls true al.o ot lant, who 
aarked the .econd etage ot ldeall .. , the stage ln whloh ldeal1 .. 
beoame oonlclous ot ltlelt. More expllo1tly than Desoarte., 
-
P. 4:41. 1 J. de Tonquedeo, Orltlque !! !! Oonna188ano~ 
2 L. Noel, ~ ~'alllme Iamedlat, p. 134. 
r 
- 61 -
(ant ralaed~tbe questlon ot the valIditl ot human knowledge. 
But wherea. Descartes was Intluenced by mathematlcs, Kant's 
preterence .ent to ph,slcs. ae wanted to glve phl1osoph1 th_ 
same stabll1ty as solence had. Only synthetical a priorl 
Judgments, he olal.s, oan glve It thls stabl11ty. Theretore, 
Kantts questlon 1s 11alted to the posslbll1ty and!oondltlons 
ot a prlorl Judgments. More c.learlf than In the cas_ ot 
Descartes, we can .ee that lant's 8tandpoll'lt w.as th_ Id_allstl0 
one. 81nthetlcal a prlorl Judpents are Judpents whloh by 
detlnlt10n have only a very 11mlted relatlon to reallty. The, 
are const~otl~nl ot the mlnd In whloh the role ot the object 
18 a mlnor one. 
We are not surprlsed to hear that thil 1nyestlgatlon 
led to Ideallsa. It 11 Ideallstlc trom the beglnnlng. Here 
agaln the tault 11es not 1n the questlon but 111 approachIng 
the questlon wlth a preJudlced alnd. ~ho.lstl can ralae the 
'antlan questlon, raake a orlt1cal examlnation ot the power.ot 
reason, .ake realon Its own Judge. 
It waa laok ot knowledge ot tradltional reall •• that 
.ade Desoartea and lant put the que.tIon the wrong va,. But 
it oertalnly la not true, that he who put. the Kantlan questlon, 
hal to glve the Kantlan anawer, .s Gllson sa, •• l 
, 
When Fr. Regls wrlt •• that the Carteslan and Kantlan 
P081t1ons are 'conaequences whlch result trom a .etaphls1cal 
/ 1 E. Gllson, Realls.e Thomlste, p. 108. 
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postulate .. to the nature ot the real-,l we entlre1, agre. 
wlth h1. but we do not see how thl1 Ihou1d torbld UI to 
conslder the .... proble •••• Desoartes and lant. What he 
sa,s ls that the, brought .etaph,sloal 1'08tu1&t88-- el •• ents 
whloh the, did not J)rove and oould not prove, beoause the, 
were 14e.11&tlo-- lnto the problem, and by dolng .0 oorrupted 
. 
the lssue, But ln po1ntlng out thelr error 1n not treatlng 
a quest10n the! wa, it should be treated, 1n not tak1ng an 
lmpart1al obJectlve attltude towards lt, he doe8 not oandean 
the questlon lt8elt. 
th1a ls lndeed the 41stlnot10n that has to be aad. 
between the question and the .ethod by whloh 1t Ihould be 
answered on the one hand, and the solution on the other. It 
la very well pOI.1ble <and ln the case ot Desoart •• lt hal 
1ndeed happened) that other e1 •• ents have orept In. .elther 
the question ltselt nor the .ethod ot orlt1oal 1nve.tlgatlon 
oan be held responslble tor thelr ideallatlo 801utlon. tne 
tault 11es in oerta1n presuppositlons, ln a preJudlced att1-
tude, laplled nelther ln the question Itselt, nor In the 
a.thod. Crlt10al rea11.ts agree that the, raise the .... 
probl ... a8 Descarte. and lant, and the, a180 take their 
a.thod (the searoh tor an lnoontestable polnt ot departure 1n 
phl10soph1, the lmpartlal!', ot DesoaJl'te., be lt oalle4 doubt 
Or not, and the or1tlca1 ... lnat10n ot knowledge ot )tant); 
- 1 L. H. Regls, St. Thomas .nel !RlstomoloSl, p.86 
r 
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but they ol~. 1maunlt1 trom Carteslan and Kan~tiaa error., 
because these are not neoessarily connected elther wlth ;he 
questlon ltselt nor wlth thelr methoda, but were 'the results 
ot metaphys10al postulates, as to the Bature ot the re.l l • 
The, tollowed trom a vrong notlon ot Jtaowledge vhlob V.I 
already there when thel approached the questlon, and v1tlated 
. 
the lolutlon. 
I When Regls wrltes that he calls attentlon to the 
opposltlons and lrreconcllabllitl ot Th~las and I4eall .. ,1 
everlbod, agrees wlth hia. All or1tloal rea11st. know that 
there is a basl0 oppos1t10n between Ideallsa and Tho.l ... 
What he should prove ls that those elements the orlt1c.l 
reallsts borrow from ldeallets are oontrar1 to Themi ... 
Cr1t1cal reall.ts dlffer trom ldeallst. even as tar as the 
lnitlal attltude towards the problem. An overall-condeanation 
ot ldeallsm does not hlt the posltlons of the oritlcal reallsts. 
-The tact that the express10n 'orlt10al Real18J1" 1. 
not older than lant hI make 1t auapect, but lt certalnlr 1. 
not reason enough to oondean lt, as Gllson seeas to do. To 
Gondemn the tena 1s ultra-collservatlve. No Thoalst should den7 
his system the opportunlt7 to protlt b1 the progress ot human 
thought, wherever 1t ma7 be toull4. aesldes such an att1tude 
vould make Thoml .. appear to be an ant1quated s1st .. whloh doe. 
-
1 ~, p. s. 
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not keep up~wlth modern times. But, however It may appear, 
!homlsm also realll becomes poorer when It retuses to oonslder 
the problems which confront modern man. 
Gl1son's seoond obJectlon agalnst crltlcal reallsm, 
vlz. that It makes metaphyslcs dependent on ep1stemology, haa 
the same foundatlon as h1s f1r,t one. Taklng as h1s start1ng 
. polnt h1s def1n1t10n of cr1t1que, he sa,. there must be an 
unbr1dgable gap between .etaph'~lost and ep1stemology. 
Ep1stemology Is the a prlorl lnvestlgatlon ot the po!er ot 
human knowledge. 10 reallstl0 prlnoiple. oan be used In 1t, 
because that would make the Investlgatlon worthless. A 
sclenoe, however, prlor to the science of belng, Is a contra-
dlct10n to a Thoalst. 
, 
I But when one th~s that a critloal examlnatlon trom 
a reallst1c standpolnt does not lose anythlng ot Its or1tical 
value, there Is a llnk between metaphyslcs and eplstemolog,. 
In regard ot the plaoe, however whlch splstemolog, 
should ocoupy there 1s no ·agreement among fhomists. Gl1aon 
lIust make 1t part ot metaph,slcs. Karlt.aln, though a orltloal 
reallst, makes It part ot metaphYslos too. Se glves two 
reasons tor thls- -Eplstemology supposes a long oontinued 
ettort to know, not only so1entlfl0 but also ph11osophio and 
Pl 7oholog1cal, 10glcal and metaphysl0al-. l Theretore, 
-
, . 
1 J. Kar1t1an, iegrees ~ Knowledge, p. 96. 
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eplstemology~oannot be the prelt.lnary oondlSlon ot philosoph,. 
The second reason 18, that -to glve eplstemology a separate 
exlstence aa a dlscipllne dlstlnot trom metaph,slcs, ls to 
lnterpose a thlrd term b.tween realls. and Id •• ll .... l Although 
"'Ain~ Marltaln reaa. • crltloal reallst, he .eeas to be here under 
the Intluence ot Gl1son. Hls vlew se ••• to be amblguous, It 
is tar trom clear. 
Hls conclusion is that there ls 'Interdependenoe 
between epistemolog, and .etaphyslcs. Eplst.mology, according 
to Maritaln, Is prlor In one order ot caus.s, .etaphysics In 
another, aocordlng to the prlnolple ot oaulae ~ 1.D.Ylaem, 
!unt oaus.e. That there il a oertain prlor1t1 ot epl.temolog1 
he atate. explicitl,: -In the endeavour to po.it an, 
Just 1deal ot speoulatlve philosophy and ot the 
two tJpioall, distinot degree. ot knowledge lit 
1aplles- the philosoph, or nature and .etaph,slca-
1t is 1n ettect neoeaaar, to tre.t tirat ot all 
ot noetles, and to establish a certaln nui5er or 
propo.lrtlons oonoerned wlth the much more general 
problem ot the relation between thought and 
reall t, •• 2 --, 
How oan Marltaln hold that there 18 no 41"lao'lon 
between metaph,slcl and .plstemologJ atter suoh a atatem.ntt 
The d18tlnctlon b.tween the two seems Indeed obvlous. It 1. 
the same dlstlnctlon there ls among the dltterent phl1osophical 
-
1 J. Mar1taln, Degrees £! Xnowledi., p. 92. 
2 Ibld, p. 98. The applloatlon ot the 
pr lnclple of caus.e ax-Invlcea 18 explained on p. !8.Gl. 
r 
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dlsclpllne.~as cosmology, psychology, aetaphls1cs. All treat 
ot belng, but all conslder a d1tterent aepect ot that b!~ng. 
Metaphyslcs ls a sclent1fl0 lnvestlgatlon Into the nature ot 
belng, what belng lSi epIst •• ologl 1. an Investlgation Into 
the Questlon whether our lntel~~ct attalns belng or not. Its 
questlon oan be sa14 the qUe8tl~n whether bellaS ls the ob~eot 
ot the Intellect. Metaph,slcs has tor Its obJeot the questIon 
gu14!!!, wha~ belng, tbe object ot the Intelleot, ls, and 
aplatemolog, the questlon !!!!!, whether be~g 1s the object 
ot the lntellect. It 1s clear that eplstamolog, Is prIor to 
metaphyslcs beoaus. metaphyslcs starts wlth \be presupposltl-
on that beleg Is the object ot tbe Intelleot, a questIon whloh 
Is solved by ep1stemology. 
Theretore, we oallnot agree wlth aegls when. he 
says: 'fhe whole neo-soholastlc eplstemological 
problem oonslst. preolsel, In establishlng that 
the knowledge ot common sense 1. true, 1 ••• , 
that 1t has a oerta1n belng •• Its obJeot. But 
It belongs to metaph,slcs to detlne belng .s 
belng and Its dlverse aodes; and that ls why It 
belongs to metaphIsICs to e.tab11sh the reall .. 
ot oommon s.n •• •• 
It .etaphyslos oonslders belng as belng and Ite div-
erl' modes, It doea not oonslder the relatlon between belng and 
knowledge. Theretore, eplste.ololr whlch considers that 
~elatlon ls a disciplin. dlatlnct trom aetaph,slca. Certalnl" 
the object ot eplstemology 18 not eomethlne outelde belng; but 
• 77. 
1 L. K. aegls, ~~. Tho.~ ~ Ep18t_oloSl, 
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then the obiect of an, .clenoe cannot be out.lde belng. 'hi. 
argument, then, would prove that there 1. onl, one dlsclpllne, 
1.e., .etaph,.lc •• 
Nelther ls 8plst_o10gy part ot peloholo.,. Both have 
the .... materlal obJ.ct vls. huaan ltnowl.4ge; but whereas 
p.,eholog, conslder, human kno¥l.dge under the aepect ot It, 
struoture, eplstemology cons1ders lts value. !be, dltter 1n 
thelr torsal object. 
Psrcbolog, anal,ses the acts ot knowledge, inqulre. 
into their ontological .tructure. Ip18t_olo81 oon8148r8 the 
act. ot knowledge tro. Mother .tandpolat. It d08. not COD-
slder those act. ln themselves, but ln thelr relatlon to 
somethlng .lse, 1 ••• , the extrasentat world. It tpl •• to 
lovestlgate what. lt &11" 18 tbe relat10n ot our knowledge to 
extr .. entat belDg. 
P'rcholog, and .pletemolo«1 are dltt.rent disciplines 
ot phllo80ph,. The, have thelr dltterent fleld. ot obeerva-
tlon. It m., happen that ln a certain era one 1s hlghl7 
developed whil. there are hardl, anr veatlge. at allot the 
Other. Medieval Tholllate abow th18 p1ctl.lre. The adVaIloe4 
Itage ot their P81cholas, should aot persuade u. to put thea 
on the 11st of ep18t08ologls'.. Van Steenberghea ••••• to 
have au., thls mlstake •• s vas po11'lte4 out ln the lntJ'oduotlon~ 
-
1 Introduction, p.4 
- 58 -
Pl7chologr and epllteaolo81 are not so Independent, 
however, that the teachings ot pa,oholo87 4.0 not have anY' 
Influenoe on eplstemolog,. On the oontrar7. there 18 an 
'lntl .. t. oonnectlon between the two dlsolp11ne.. So muoh 10, 
that a speolal pSlohologloal explanatlon ot the struoture ot 
the aot of knowledge, can aake a realistl0 ep1.t_olog1 
Impos.lble. Xeroler va. not entlre1, wrong when he treated 
eplat_oloD .s a part ot palcho10Q. 
At the root ot the Cart.81an and .Kant1an eplataolo-
gloal errors we tlnd a1.cencept1ona about human knovle4g. 
whlch perta1n to pSl0h0logl. Hl.underttandlng ot the •• chanl0 
ot the human Intellect made thea go .8,ra, 1n the tleld ot 
eplsteaologJ. Thesl 41801plloe. are Interre1at.. The,. 
depend on one another. A .1.take aad. In one must nece •• arll, 
lead to talse oonoluslon. In the other also. But tbat doe. 
not prevent u. tro. oalling thea 41tterent 41.oIplln •• , alnoe 
-'.'''-
the, all have thelr own tleld ot &ctlvltl. thelr ewn toraal 
obJeot. so.etl.e •• ven thelr own .ethod b, whlOb thel 41tter 
one trom another. 
There 11 another d1801pUne wlth whlch eplate.olog7 
11 related. vlz. 10glo. It has even been called lep,ga ... .10;r. 
But tor the .... reaSOD that it 1. DO part ot •• taph7alc8 or 
P1lcholog,. lt 1. no part ot 10g10 elther. The obJeot ot 10glo 
1, human knowledge but lt doe. not oon.lder thl. knowledge 1n 
1'1 relatlon wlth rea11t1. but .,rel, 1n It.elt. It 18 a 
----------------........ 
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praot1oal s01ence and Its purpose ls to t1nd the rule. whloh 
have to be observed In order to &rrlve .. t 1oorreot knowledge. 
It compr1ses the techn10al part or knowledge. It •••• know-
ledge as an 1nstrwaent and 1t teaches aan hoW' to u.se thl. 
lnstruaent 1n a oorrect wa,. It doe. not Inve.tlgate In the 
value of hUDlan knowledge, but taltes that tOl' crantM. 
Eplstemology 1. not a praotloal sclence but a 
speoulatlve one. Its end 18 not to teaoh rule. but to prove 
a theorr. IncIdentally, tbe speolal epIste.olol1 (1n contra-
dls+tlnction to general eplsteaology) provide. al80 rules to 
be observed 1n the d1tterent kInds ot knowledge, beoause it 
laY8 down the cond1tlon. under wblch th.se varlou. klnds ot 
knowledge are trustworthy. Its onll end, however, 1. to 
Just1ty the knowledge It •• lt. 
Eplateaolosy, pS7oholo81 aDd 10glo ue s1ll11ar 1n 
thelr materlal obJeot wbich ls human knowledge, but they 41fter 
1n thelr tonal object, the a~eot under whlch tbe, oons14er 
th1s knowledge. PB7oholog7 oonsiders It. nature or ontolOgical 
struoture; 10glc ltB technlcal structure ln order to find 
rules for Its oorreot u •• ; eplstemology oonslders not 1ta 
ttruoture but Ita valu •• Thereln It d1ffers botb troa ps,choloS' 
and 10g1o. Theretore, 1t 1s better not to call 1t ~osloa KaJgr 
or Psychology but to give It 1t8 own nu. of Eplst.molol7. It 
is a disc1p11ne 41tterent tro. all other ph1losophlcal 
41 l clpllnel. 
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Ae tor the place It should ooouP1 among th .. , even 
those authors who do not want to oall It a dlsolpllne dltter-
ent trom .eteph,s1c. want to see It treated at the beglnning 
ot .etaphralcs. 
This goes wlthout .a11ng. The que.tlon t!! J!!' 
alwa1. aust co.e betore the qu~stlon 'quid .1t'. Eplstemologr 
treats about the questIon '!n s1!', whether belng Is the object 
ot human knowledge. The aclentltlc value ot human knowledge-
whether human knowledge attalns reallt1 haa to be eatabllshed 
betore thie same human knowledge la ueed In sol.ntltlc InY.atl-
gatlon. That thls can be done wlthout call1ng In questlon 
nalve reall .. has been shown alreadr. flrlt epllttmologr 
solentltlcally ,atabllshe. the taot that human knowledge 
teaohe. UI about belng, atterwards .,taph,alol telll ua what 
belng 11. But auat we not know what belng Is betor, .e oan 
flnd out that the human lntelleot really attalnl It, alk those 
who lide wlth Gilson? Must not we tlrst .stablish that our 
lntellect ls a tlt Inetruaent to lead us to beIng, is the 
questlon ot the orltioal reallsts. 
Thls Is the sam. problem which appears ever7Where 
In phllosophr where the question '.!!!.!!!' must be consldered. 
Row can one talk about the exlatenoe ot a thing betore knowlng 
what It ls? The aame questIon arlaes in natural theology 
Where the existence ot God haa to be proved betore the questIon 
l~hO He ls, and the dltflculty ls how this can be done. 
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io ln eplstemology the questlon ls whether huaan 
. 
knowledge attalns belng; and thls questlon haa to be treated 
betore .etaph,a1cs, whlch treats about tbat belng. The 
solutlon to thls probl .. ls that we need not have made a 
metaphysioal lnqulry lnto the nature ot belng. A ooaaon 
knowledge ot what being ls, ls, sufticlent to taokle the problem. 
The treatlse ot .etaphysic. later wl11 certalnly clarlty what 
has been treated ln ~lst .. ology, ln the ..... 87 •• the 
treatlse about God'. aatur. ln natural theology wlll clar!t1 
what has been sald ln the tlrst chapter where 818 exlstenc. 
wae belng proved. Episteaology sheds lts I1ght upon aeta-
physios and metaphysl0' doe. the .... for .p1.teaology, beoause 
they are lnterrelated. 
Metaphysics does not se.m to be necessary tor 
epist.mology. What 1s required 1. onl1 a oommon non-ecientltl0 
knowledge ot reallty (belng) and an tapart1al attltude, wbloh, 
CI. 
as has been shown, imp11es a re~lstlo p •• ltlo •• 
Does not thls then de.tro, the prtmac1 ot meta-
ph,slos' By no .eans. What do .e understand b, the prlmaoy 
ot metaphyslc.? Pr~o7 ot •• taph¥.lo8 .eans that .etaphyslc., 
because lt treate ot belng, whloh 11 the t1rst and deep.s' 
not10n, oovere the tleld ot all other 101ence. ln a wa7. The, 
all cons1der belng under eome Ipeolal aspect; aetaph,a108 
tonl1dere lt a. belng. theretore, metaphyslos aheds ltl I1ght 
Oil all other aolenoes. Xetaph,81oa 1s the queen or s01enoes. 
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In a oerta~n war all other aclenoes are dependen' on •• ,.-
physlcs,' aa metaphyslca gives the ultlmate explanatloR ot 
all reallty. In this eplatemolosy whloh tre.ts ot beinl 
llke the other onea, la dependent on metaphyslcs a180. But 
trom another polnt ot Vlew the dependenoe &&7 •• 11 be the 
other way. The speoltio qU.8~10n tor eplataology ls not 
about be1ng as belng, b\tt about its relatlons to knowl.dge" 
C<J The very eXistenoe ot .etaphys1os depend. on these relatlons. 
fh1. 1s the lnterrel,t1on ot the so1enoes whlch 1s posslble 
beoause ot the dltterent klnds ot oausality, oausae !! ... In-.v .... 1 ..... o_e ... m 
sunt oausae. 
-"* 
Xetaphyslos and ep1stemology are 1nterrelated; but, 
ln the order ot belng, metapb7s1cs oerta1nly has the pr1aaoy 
over ep1stemology aa over all other 801enoes. 
The conclusion is that there seems to be no contra-
dlctlon here elther. As already was being polnted out,the 
aaln error ot Gilaon ls a wrong notion ot oritlque. 'lhls seem. 
to ~ the beginnlng ot the whole trouble. 
Kaybe1t 18 posslble to tlnd a Itill aore protound 
reason ot Gllson's error. Van Iteeraberghan pOints out that 
Gilson detlne. belng aa that whloh is ontologloa11, lndependent 
of consclousness. "Gilson ls wrong in taklng "I'eal' to .ean 
10.'th1ng ontologlcal11 independent ot consc1ousness and 
OPPoslng lt on that accounttG the 00g1to. lverrth1ng ls real, 
inoludlng the C081tO. The d1st1nct1on ot an obJectlv. real 
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from a subjective real 18 glven Just as lamedlatel, aa the 
dom1natlng character of the object. But the ontologioal 
lndependence ot the obJectlve real, with re.peot to the aub-
Ject 18 not at all eVlden,-.l All this .eea. to be vel', much 
& quest10n of stre... Gilaon never sa,a expllolt, that the 
idea has no rea11ty, but when he apeaks about reality he .eans 
extrasental real1ty, independent ot the 14ea, the object a. 
such, and not the obJeot as object. ae opposes too muoh 
though' and reall ". AcoordlJlg 'lo hl. the danger 1a • ex&l tel' 
1& reallte de. ldee.-. 2 Th1s had it. rep.rcu.11onl on hls 
.olution ot the epistemological probl .. , according to Van 
Steenberghen. 
The only sound p01nt ot departure tor a Thoalstic 
eplstemology ls the COftoept a. the 1ntellect presents 1t, the 
conoept whlch hal not let been worked upon by philosophere. 
Th1s conoept 11 presented not only al a tora ot the alnd, but 
as a tOl'll whlch hal a detlnl te content. Thls conoept provldes 
a base tor a orlt1cal lnTestliatlon ot husan knowledge whlch 
must satlstf everybodl who 1s not preJudioed. As the oa •• of 
the ldea11st. and, ln the fho.latlc oaap, of Gllson ShOWI, 
however, 1t seems to be extp ••• ly d1fficult to adhere to thie 
lapart1al polnt ot departure. 
-
1 F. V. Steenberghen, ~p18te.olo'l. p. 97. 
also p. 177 note. 
,/ 







GILSON'S POSITIVE EPISTEMOLOGY 
It, as Gilson claims, there cannot be a critical 
approach to the epistemological questIon, 1s there realI, an 
epIstemological quest10n let" It would seem that one either 
has to Instltute a oritlcal 1nvestigation 1nto tbe relat10na 
between knowledge and realIty or aake a postulate out or them. 
The statement that there 18 no plaoe tor a oritique, tor a 
Judgment ot knowledge in real1 .. , that reall88 11 Indefensible, 
seems to leave no other p08sIbIl1tl but to accept reall .. as a 
postulate. 
GIlson eeeas to hold soa.thlng 11ke thIs 1n hI. 
" / b! Realism. Metbodlgue. There he sa,8: ·We see no other 
alternative nov-A-days than to glve up all •• taph1sIcs or 00 •• 
back to a pre-oritical r.all .. •• l A few pages betore he had 
.tated: ·Scholastlcl .. attirae the exIstence ot an object, 
dIet1not trom the subject, mor. lUte a postulate than l1ke a 
ooncluslon tt • 2 Iadeed there .eems to be no alternatIve than 
thls, for where 1s the eplsteaological probl .. , it one has to 
aooept realIsm as • postulate? 
./ / 1 E. Gileon, 1:e! aeall .. l! Xethod1g,ue" p. 15. 
2 ~, p. 10. 
.----------------------------------------'--------------------~ 
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~oel drew th1s oonclus10n 1n h1s paper on Thomistlc 
Eplstemology at the Seoond Internat10nal fhomlstlc Qongress at 
Rome ln November 1936. There he atated: 
-The leglt1maoT ot ep1.tamolog1 has beea oalled 
lnto questlon by outstand1ng thlnkers •• One auat 
reJeot every eplstemology, get rld of the probl .. 
ot knowledge whloh 1s only a talse problem-,I 
The context ot th1s'statement pOinted toward Gllson, 
and 1n his Reall~e thomlste !! Cr~tlgue J! l! gonna18sanoe 
the latter defended hlmselt and ma1d that he d1d not den1 the 
leg1tlmaoy or neoesslty ot eplsteaology. but only Hsgr. Noel'. 
method ln ep1stemology.2 He sa,8: -It 18 evldent that ever, 
ph1losoph1 oan and must ask itselt about the problem ot know-
ledge. Plato, Aristotle, Salnt thomas and mant thinkers ot 
the K1ddle Ages did the 8am8. 3 There ls a real problem ot 
knowledge, but the solution haa to be glven 1n •• taphls1ol. 
There is no real eplstemology as a d1so1pllne dlstinot tro. 
metaphysios. ,;' On the other hand, he sars alsc lil ~all ••• ! 
Thomlste that the existenoe ot the ext~aa.ntal world 18 no 
problem. The tact that 80ae philosophers make 1t a proble., 
does not mean that 1t is a real probl... The existenoe ot the 
extramental world il evldent. It oannot be denled exoept 07 
those who v1ew It trom a wrong pos1tlon and dontt admit ltl 
-
1 L. Noel, It! aeall .. e Ieed1at, p. 282. 
/' . 2 I. G1lson, Reali ... ~o.l.te, p. 36 note. 





evidence.l~ But then one asks oneselt, it the existenoe ot 
the ext ram en tal world i8 not a probl .. , what then is the 
epistemologioal problem, whioh Gilson 8&YS does exi8t? Is 
not the epistemologloal probl.. the quest10n whether our 
knowledge really attalns extramental reality, as 1t sa,s it 
does? And does not thls mean.the questlon or the exlstenoe 
ot the ext ramen tal world? 'or Is It not our knowledge which 
unites us with the extr .. ental world? 
In Realisae Thoalste G1lson expllcitly denles that 
real1sm 1s a mere postulate. He detlnes a postulate as a 
propositlon whioh one 1s asked to adm1t a8 true, but wbloh il 
ne1ther evident nor demonstrable-. 2 For a realist the existenoe 
ot extramental real1t, ls ev1dent and, thererore, cannot be 
a postulate. 
Gllson's posit10n In epistemology hal not been the 
same trom the beglnn1ng, al ha8 been lndioated already. There 
18 progress, even between the two books ot 1936 and 1939. H18 
attltude toward reallSM has ohanged. This Is evident even trom 
the tltles. While the tirst 18 called Method1oal Rea11sm, 
which words do not leave any doubt about the Intentlons ot 
the author but Indloate what 18 golng to be derended, the .econd 
book ls Just plaln Thomlstlc Reallsa. 
-
1 ~, p. 236. 
2 ~, p. 194. 
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Gl1son's changes are mls1eadlng even tor hls tollow-
ers. ThuB Fr. G. Smlth wrltes 1n the Maritaln volume ot the 
Thomist: MAs to the lS8ue itaelt, - do we or do we not know 
eXistents, - it 18 one whose resolution is anterior to 
demonstratlon and selt-evldenoe. It cannot be proved, d18-
1 proved, named selt-evldent 9r a postulate-. 
This 1s mix1ng up Gilson's oplnlons ot the various 
perlods. He alway. held that lt oould not be demonstrated,-
and 80 do the orltical rea11sts, - but whereas be oonsidered 
lt more aa a postulate or a method to be u.ed 1n his ~e 
~ea118m. Methodlgue. ln his Realls •• Thomlat. the .tress talls 
on the evidenoe. Moreover it a thing oannot be deBonatrated, 
and 11 not evldent elther, and oannot be accepted al a 
postulate, what else ls lett' 
As we dld ln the tlrst ohapter .e shall treat the 
two books apart and glve tlrst an explanation ot Glleon'. 
epistemology as 1t oan be round ln hla b! Realisme Xelh2dlgue, 
.,. 
and then a8 it appears 1n Reallsme Tho.lste. 
~ REALISME HETHODIQg! 
Gllson wants to go back to the posltlon or Tho.lsm 
betore mode~n t1mes, because !homl .. ln modern times hal 
deViated bY' looklng too much to ldealla.. What were these 
anoient Thomlsts and 8t. Thomas himselt? Undoubtedly thel were 
~ea11ats. Thelrs was the sound rea11sm ot a healthy reason not 
1 In! Tho.lst Harltaln Voluae p. 248. I 
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<I) yet corrupted by modern decadence. They ne.er asked the.selvel 
the question whether the Intellect wa8 an apt 1nstrument to 
teach them about real1t,. Thelr reall .. wa8, .a Gllson S&18, 
precrltlcal. It certa1nl, was not a oonclusion after a 
scientiflc invest1gat1on into the struoture and act1vity ot 
the lntellect. It vaa more of a postulate. One oan sa, that 
St. Thomas' metho~ ln ph1losoph, was real1sm; a method about 
whioh he d1d not ask himselt an, questlon •• 
Gilson wants to go baok to thi. attitude, us1ng 
realism .erely as a .ethod. Theretore, he gives hls book the 
tl t1e .&! ReallSJ1le MethodlgufP or Methodical Reall_. His 
concern Is to tlee the danger. ot ldeallsm and the retore 
his urging: wBaek to the Mlddle Ages-. ·Scholastiel .. 18 a 
conselous, retlected and Intended reallsa, but a reall •• which 
18 not based on the solution ot a prob1ea, rai •• 4 by ldealls., 
becaus •. the data ot th1s problem lmplr necessarlly ldea11sa 
&. Its 8olut1on,.l 
"In 1930 1 , writes Van Riet 1n ~·Epl.t.mologle 
thomlsts, "Thomlstlc reall .. Is a purel, methodical rea11 .. 
tor Mr. Gllson; 1t Justit1es ltselt onlT through conslderatlona 
drawn trom hlstorr".2 fh1s 18 ~ll1 ver, muoh the case 1n 1936, 
the ,ear ln which ~ ~ea11 .. e .e!hOdlque appear,. K1storr show. 
-
." / 1 E. G11son, ~ Reallsae ~ethod19ue, p. 11. 
2 Van R1.', ~t'pllt'molO!l. Thoalste, p. 514. 
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that 1dea11 .. does not lead to a satlstaotor, phl10soph1 but 
on the contrary ls the gat .. ., to sceptlcl.m. Theretor., let 
us stlck to the attitude ot medleval fhoml .. and u.e reall .. 
as a .ethod, w1thout asking anI quest10ns. Wew1ll have to 
choose between methodlcal real1 •• wlth the Balvatlon at 
.etaph,slos on one hand, and oritloal rea11 .. with the ultimate 
los. ot metaphYslos on the other. The lound .ethod ls to 
start trom realls., becau.e m.taphls101 18 sate wlth It.1 
'Ideall •• shows lts lmpotence to oonstruct a vlabl. 
phl10s0ph1·. 2 flme and agaln Gllson lnslsts on the sterillt, 
ot modern phllosoph1. 3 Soholastlc reallsm, however, 11 'the 
reallsm ot the traveller, who proceeds towards a goal, and, 
seeing that he approaohes lt, trults that he took the rllh' 
dlrectlon l • 4 
All thls does not lound ver1 oonv1nclng. His cr1tles 
reproached Gileon that 1t looked more l1ke praaaatlsa. W. are 
rea11sts because reallsm is the best foundation tor a 
philosoph1, or as Gilson s&7s '1t leads to a 101enoe as .ell 
a8 to a •• taphysics; there tore , 1t ls a sound .ethod to .tart 
v1th, •5 
1 i. ~ ,-Gilson, ~ Reall._ x,!thod1gue, p. 86. 




p. 51, 83. 
4 ibid, p. 16 
5 ibid, p. 88. 
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~ Practlcal reasons, however, never were much 1n tavor 
1n Thoaiam. 'l'rue ph1108oph7 inqulres lnto the aature of thinge, 
the ultlmate oauses. Truth 1. l1s cr1terlon, not u •• fuln •••• 
It 11.&1 very ".11 b. that a workable hJPothes18 tuma out not 
to be the true one. 
It .ee.. that Gl1son doe. not have a fir. oonv10t10n 
at thls stag.. A doctrin. oan elther be proved, or it 1. 
evldent, or lt has to be aooepted .s a hJpOth •• 1a or a postu-
late. Gllson was sure that 1 t oould not be proved. aecalll 
lt evldent, but on the other hand he doea not want '0 atr ••• 
thll, beoause be ls aware ot the tact that too • .., aerioue 
phl1osopher. do not a.e the evid.noe at all. It c.rtalnl, 1s 
a strange thlng to oall a dootr1ne ev1dent when 1t 1a ~lnl 
den1ed 01 man7 out.tandlng phl1osoph.rs. There must ba 10 •• -
thlng wrong wlth the evidenoe. Theretore, no other alternatlve 
rema1ned tor bim than to sa, tbat 1t va. a poatulate or hJpO-
thesl. or method. The proof tor a hr.pothe.l., bovever, 11e. 
in lts workab1l1ty. So Gilson vas brought to In.er, this 
strange element in hi. philosophy. He inyokes a prassatlc 
Justlticat10n tor a tbing he alread7 oalla evident. '!boalst10 
reallsm ls based on the ev1denoe ot 1tl prlnciple, and Ju.tl-
rlea itselt b7 a crltiQue of ldea1168 which 'howe the i.potence 
or this dootr1ne to construct a vlable Ph1lo.ophl,.1 
-
1 lb14, p. 12. 
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w.e can tlnd the ..... ort ot r.asons, inlplred by 
pragaatlsm in Reglsle MSt. !homas 4lld Kplste.oAoerl. H. 
looke tor a satlstylng .xplanatlon ot the unlty and plurallt1 
w. tlnd In the unlvers., and conolude. b, say1ng that Ideal1s. 
1 18 wrong, because 'lt exclud •• the dlverslty ot the real'. 
At which an Ideallst wl1l prob$bly answ.r: ISO wbat? fhll ls 
what the questlon Is about'. Ivery Ideallst know. that hls 
87ste. makes reallt, unique. A retutatlon cannot take as Its 
polnt ot departure the thing that has to be proved. 
" When Regla .ays that fhomlstlc realls. 1. the only 
reallsm that truthtul11 takes account ot the oOllplexlty ot 
human knowledge,2 ever1bod1 wl11 agree wlth hl., but another 
questlon Is, whether It ls true beoause ot that realon. 
Thomlstl0 real1 .. ls not true because It 1. a .ethod ot whlOb 
the workabl11t, oan be Ihown afterwardl. 
When somebody obJeots that by reJeotlng orltlcal 
" reall .. he 11 bound to beco.e a dogmatllt, aegll answers bl 
polntlng to a oertaln evldence: 'there 1. a wlldom whlch take. 
account of the reallstlc Inatlnct ot thls knowledge, ot whlch 
:5 
wlsdo. wl1l make manlfe.t the part that 11 true'. Nowhere 
1 L. M. 
J). 48. 
'" Regls, st. fhomas ~ Kplstemoloil 
2 ~, p. 54. 












else 1n~18 lecture does he expla1n these er1Pt10 worda. 
/ Begls's leoture show I the .... 8lxture ot .eal1 .. aa a .ethod, 
as evldent and as a workable h1Po~e81. that we t1n4 1ft 
'" ,-Gilson's ~ aeall .... ethodlgue. 
./ There i8 not muoh that 1. po.1tl". ln YReal:J." • 
./ Xethodlgul. Thomlstic realts. detends lt8elt b7 showlng tbat 
ldeallam oannot 1.a4 to .etmph,810'. 'It 14e.ll .. bat 
suooeeded ln const1tuting a set ot .v14ent prino1ple. and 
pre"ed 1tl .xp11eatl", teoundlt" lohola,t101 .. would have 
nothlng to obJeot,.l The Justltlcatlon ot fhoalstle reall .. 
1s a negatl"e one. 
Although he .entloRS r,tlez1on he 401. not sa, much 
about It. Thls ls understandable. fhe role ot retlezlon ln 
hll tplstemolog1 18 a 81nor one. He do., not •• ea retlezlon 
a. the orltloal re.ll.ts 40. 
Reallsa 1s e"ldent and lts ."ldenoe 1, provlded b, 
a •• n.lbie 1ntultlon. 'fhe exl.teaoe ot the exterlor vor14 
1, evldent, but b7 the concrete and dlreot ev1denoe ot • 
len81ble lntuition whloh tran.lat •• it.elt 1n an abatraot and 
dlrect W&1 lnto a JUdgment-. 2 
The senslble experlenoe guarantee. the real1sm ot 
our knowledge. The .ens •• brln, us lnto contact wlth extra-
a.ntal reallty. Thl. ls evtdent. Intellectual knowledge 18 
-
1 !ill, p. 12 
2 ~, p. 48 
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real18t1~b.cau8. 1t is a d1reot translation or sense knowledge, 
lt 1s based on eense knowl.edge, and theretore, sharel in ita 
realism. It has no evldence ot ltself, however, but dependa 
on the evldence or the aen ••• , tor, aa Gllson laTI, 'the 
s.nalble 1ntuition alone guarantee. the exlstenoe ot lta 
ObJeot-.1 
Th1s .enalble evldenoe has to be aooepted aa •• oh. 
It cannot be transformed lnto a rational AeduottoD or induo-
tlon. 10 demonstrat1on 1, poss1ble. That would destroy 
rea11.. again. 
", '" Th1. 1s all that !r.! Reall ... Metho41g"! 001lta1.ul 1n 
tbe vaT ot a pos1t1ve expos1tlon of eplst •• ology. Ho wonder 
that h1s opponents complained and asked hi. 1t there WAS much 
d1tterence between this eplstemology and acceptlng reall .. 
almply as a postulate. Dld not Gl1lon hlasel! .&y that h. 
aooepted 1t beoause of the dlsastra"l consequenc •• ot 1deal1 .. , 
The ev1denoe 41d not sound verT conv1ncing. 
REALISME fHOHISTS 
Accord1ng to R. Verneaux 1n ~·Ep1It"olOS1. !! 
~ Gilsonl the epistemology ot flllon would oonslet ot thr •• 
part.: tlrst a crltique ot the attempt. ot concorAl .. , 1 ••• , 
a refutat10n ot those thlnkers who derend reall .. by a.anl of 
-
1 E. Gl1son, aeall ... Tho.l~te, p. 195 - 196. 
2 Itlenne G1180n, p. 218. 
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a crltlque ~f knowledge. Gl1son calls thea ooncordlat, beoAu.e 
they Intend to reconcIle !haal .. wlth lantl .. and Oarte,lan 
Ideallsm; aeoond11 a critiqu. ot 14.all .. , b1 abovlng that 1t 
Is based on a aere pre.u.ptlon and that lt neo.asarll, lead, 
I to loeptlo1_; thirdl, a posltlve e%pestlon of knowledge not 
defendlng lta realltm but 8how~ng how e8n.ltlve and Intellectual 
knowledge attaln reallt,. 
Gllson' e rea11_ aocording to Veraeau ie a .ethodloa 
dogaatlc and retlexlve reali... W. alread, aav that ln thl. 
second book the str ••• tall. aore on It. evldenoe than on It. 
belng used as a .ethod. Its belng .ethodlo&! va. a tactor ot 
lmportance ln ~ Riali_! Xethodlql1e. becau.e th.ereln Gll.on 
aaw Its Justltlcatlon. Afterwards, however, he bee .. e aore 
and more convlnoed not onll ot Its belng evldent, but ot the 
tact that lts Justlflcat10n oould be tound ln Its belng evldent. 
It atl1l can be oalled methodlcal reall .. , beoau.e the •• thod 
Thoml.ts uae In thelrphlloaoph, 1s the reallstl0 one, but the 
name methodlcal ls no longer oharaoter1stl0. R.all .. does not 
tlnd 1 t. Justltloatlon ln 1 ts belne u.ed a. a .ethod. /I 
It 1s dogaatlc realis., vhloh .ean. not that it 18 a 
postulate, but merel, that l' caDnot be 4eaoDs'rate4. It 1. 
eVldent; lt does not need a demonstratlon. Gl1son oal18 1t 
/ dogmat1c ln Rea118m~ Thomlste. -Ever,thlng can be orltioal ln 
a ~eallatlc phllos0ph7 exoept 1ts reall .. ltselt. That ls the 
----------------.......... .. 
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true poslt~on ot dogmatlc reall .. wh1ch we aetenA,.l 
It 1s a reflexlve reall .. , the retlez10n maklng lt 
a philosophical r.allsm, dlstlngu1shed irom the nalve reallsm 
ot co .. on .ense. This retl.z10n, how.ver, 1. not a or1tlqu.; 
it doe. not e.tabllsh anything, lt doe. not dltf.r trom aft, 
other r.tlex1oft. It la the .~. r.tlexion aa 1, b.lng u,e4 all 
over phl10soph,. 
G11son no longer uses the pragaatl0 argument. b. uaed 
, '" 1n ~ Realls.e Kethodlgu.. Realls. 1s not the true a,st .. 
becaus. lt leads us to a .etaph,slos, while ldeall .. does not. 
Reall .. 1s true because lt ls evldent. St111 the r.tutation 
ot ldeall .. pla,s aver, iaportant role ln hls eplst .. o1ol1. 
When Gl1son descrlbe. the oours. that an eplstemologr should 
tollow he •• ntlon. tlrst the Idet.ns. ot truth agalnst those 
2 
who contest the tlrst pr1no1pl •• •• 
fhe second thlng to do, acoordlng to Gl1son, 1. Ito 
let the tlrst prlnolple. appear 1n tul1 11ght, ln th.lr .vldenoe 
as prlnclpl •• •• 3 Thls .tag. 18 what orltloal r.ali.ts would 
0"1 the most lmportant part ot eplst_olocr, the eplstaolo-
gloal probl_. wheth.r human knowl.dge know. extr ... ntal realltr 
1 E. Gllson, Re.ll ... fhoalste, p. 160. 
2 !:2!!, p. 227. 





or not. <I) They d1sagree, however, 1n the object ot tbe orltical 
refleotlon. 80 •• of thaa take the .ena. peroeptlon (G'n7, 4. 
Tonqued.c) others the lntelleotual Judgment (Van ateenberghen, 
loel) others the Goglio (Pioard) Itl11 others the tlrlt 
prlnciple. (Marltaln 1n a wa,). Gl1son 41 .. 188 •• lt wlth 
saylng that 1t 18 ev1dent. -And wben soa.bod, object. that lf 
lt really 1s ev1dent lt ahould be ev1dent for ever7b04y, he 
answers that even for 14sal18ta lt 1s evldent as .en, but 1t 
,. oea.es to be evldent tor the. a. ph11osophera. Why 4on' t the,. 
aocept the s... thlnge as ph1losophers as the, 40 al .en? Th. 
tact reaalns that 1t 1a evident, and he aakea u. lnstltute a 
raflezion to abow that our aen ••• do not decelve UI,l though 
he does not use the word rat18z10n. 
The greater part ot hil epistemology is devoted to 
the questlon how to explain the taot that our taoultie. attaln 
reallty. In Belns and !!!! Philosopher., whlch 1, a further 
develop.ent ot his dootrlne, he .ua. up hi. poslt1on .s tollow •• 
'The two prerequi.ite. to the posslbillt, ot 
exlstent1al Judgaents are that realltr should 
include an eXistentlal act over and abo.e It. 
essenoe, and that the huaan alnd be naturall, 
able tograap it •• That the huaan alnd ls able 
to grasp 1t 1s a taot, and it so .an, philosophers 
s ... to doubt lt, lt ls becau.e tDe, tall to gra.p 
the cognlt!ve power ot Jud .... '·. 
llbl~ p. 196. 
2 E. G11son, BelQS !!! I!!! Phllosopher., 
toronto, 1949, p. 202. 
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"l '1'ha t there 1s an extruen tal rea11 t7 and that the 
human mind oan attaln It are the two prerequIs1t... Acoording 
to Gilson the, are evIdent. The .aJor probl .. ot h1$ eptste-
mology oonalsts 1n explaining b2! the mlnd gra8pB thle real1t" 
not whether the mlnd graaps It. Or1tloal real1sts oaQ agree 
with Gileon In his turther expos1tlons. When the taot baa 
been .stablished that the h\lll$Jl Intell.ot attaln's reall t7, 
bo~ G1lson and the crltical rea11sts tollow the .... path; 
bot have to ahow ~ tbe mlnd r.ach •• tbat rea11ty, In what 
operatlon and at what polnt .xac,.,17. 
For the tollowlng consideratlons It 1. ot no laport-
anoe whether one ls a orlt10al realist or not; the disousslon 
takes plaoe In a further stage. Our orlt101 .. ot Glleon 18, 
theretore, not attected.We aalntaln that he 11 wrong 1n 
condemn1ng the vay tollowed bl the or1t1cal rea11.,. to .stab-
l1sh reallsm and that h1. own pos1tion, even hls t1nal one ot 
evldence, 1e an unlatlsfylng one, but "e thiU that b18 
anal,sl. of the aot1v1ty ot the human 1.1.1180t 11 p~toun4 
and worth cone1derlng, although aa ve shall expla.1n tUl'ther on, 
lt pertalns more to Pl1oholo17 than '0 ep1at .. oloiJ. 
It belongs to metaph,II01 to 'etlne what reallt7 or 
be1ng Is and that 11, accordlng to Glllon, vh, it 18 part ot 
.etaph7s1CI to desorlbe how huaaa knowledge attalns It. In the 
"cond chapter ve have explall'uxl what to think ot that vlew. 1'1 
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1Ietapb,1101 t.aoh •• U8 tbat the element whloh aalt •• 
re.llt, real 11 exlltenoe. Gll.on l • SelftS !!! 80 •• 'hl1o,oRh.~. 
1s a.evotea. to that problea ant b. give. 80.' .e1"7 p~to\U'ld anA 
reveallng exposlt1ons Oft the _&tt81-, showing how it haloDeen 
treated bl the great •• 1 thlftkere throughout the hi.tort of 
~h11o.0~h1. Ue point. out tha~ all tho •• phllosophie. whloh 
d1d not acoept the aot ot eXlstenoe resulte4 ln fal1ure •• 
The aot ot eXlstence !ben, hal to be attained b1 
human knowledge, ii lt would olal. to attain reallt1. fh11 
ls where the ~robl_ .tartl. Exl.tenoe 1, no .enslble quallt,. 
The .en ••• ~ero.lv. on11 the aooldents, qua11t1. quantlt" eto., 
they never penetrate into the .s.enoe ot the thiftg, .tl11 le •• 
into exlstenoe. The .enses only teaoh u. about the 60014 .. 'al 
~rop.rtle. ot ~ini'. 
On the other hand, our lntelle.hal uovle4ge 1. 
ab.traot. It work. wlth 14 .... , conoeptl. lIhea •• kilO" aan 
intellectuall" our knowledge 18 true ot reall, exl.tlne • .a, 
but lt 18 not verlfled al suoh ln anr llving .an. Ixlltenoe, 
however, i8 alva1. oonorete. There i8 no ab,tract eXistenoe. 
EXistenoe 18, 07 definltlon, that what -.ke, the ••• enoe thi. 
aotual concrete essen... Oon •• quentl, there oannot be a 
oonceptual abetraot knowledge ot eXistence.1 
-
1 L. M. Regll denles thi. 1ft an art1cle on 
Beins ~ Soae Philosopbe,... Modern 80hooaan 1951, 
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~ Existenoe, theretore, oannot b. the obJect or our 
ordinary abstraot knowledge. Thi. is preeis.ly what St. Thoa.s 
says when he states that the object ot our intellect is 
essenees. l Our oonceptual knowledge 1s about the qu1dd1tl, 
obta1ned trom the phantasm bl seans or abetraotion. Our oon-
cepts have only an lntent10nal exlstenoe. They do not exlst 
as suoh 1n reallty. 
Ex1stenoe doe. not have a content, oontent be1ng 
so.eth1ng ot essence. Ex1stence doe. not add an1thlng to 
essenoe; lt only makes the essence real, aotual. As existence 
does not prov1de a oontent ln the aotual thlng, does not add 
to anythlng to lts essenoe, so it cannot give a content either 
to an intentional existence 1n a concept. We oannot reach 
existenoe ln its ooncreteness ln the ooncept. 
The questlon, theretore, remalna: how do we know 
existence? It oannot be known by our senses. Our senses 
glve us knowledge on11 about external aooldental appearances. 
The1r knowledge ls in the order ot essenoes. As a prinoiple 
ot a ooncrete being 1t should co.e nevertheless under 
1 
afercep tlon. 
The aotiv1ty ot the intellect on the other hand 1s 
not perceptive but oonceptive. It works by mak1ng abstraoi 
ooncepts by means of the concrete phantasm. But ex1stenoe 
-
1 B! Spirituallbus Creaturi8, A. XI. ad 7. 
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belng the prlnclple ot a concrete thlng and Itaelt lndlvldual 
too, should be percelved not concelved ln an abstract way. 
The solutlon Is that existence has to be apprehended 
In the senslble datum. lIn order that a man percelve exlstence 
wlth hls lntellect, It Is necessary that exlstence be glven 
to hlm In an exlstent, whlch l,s perceptlble to hls .enslb-
111t1,.1 Exlstence cannot be percelved otherwlse than In the 
actually exlstlng thlng. But thls thlng ls only presented to 
the knower by the senses. theretore, In the exlstlng thlng 
whloh ls present to the knower ln the phantasm, the Intelleot 
must percelve Ita exlstenoe. Thls Is a oertaln klnd ot an 
lntellectual Intultlon, as Van Rle' observes. l It marks a 
substantlal development ot Gllson's eplstemology slnoe Le 
-
Reallsme Xethodlque. There he had only the sense perceptlon 
as hls explanatlon ot reall •• ; here It Is a sensltlve-
intellectual evldence. 
When does thls Intelleotual peroeptlon ot exlstence 
take place? Gl1son answera: In the second aotlvity ot the 
intellect, the Judgment. 'When the concept ot belng ls 
abstraoted trom a ooncrete exlstent percelved b1 the san.es, 
the Judgment whloh predloates existence ot thls exlstent 
attrIbutes exlstence to lt In the wa, the Intellect sees It, 
1 E. Gllson, Reallsme Tho.lste, p. 215. 
e Van Riet, AttEl!lstemolosl! Tholllste, p.509, 
~J 0 iI' 0 b • -\-,,~) . 
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1.e., ln the senslble datum trom whlch the intelleot abstract_ 
It ... l 
·We directly know peroelVed data as beings so tha, 
our d1rect knowledge of th .. inol_4e. an intultlve experience 
of their very aots ot ex18tln,-.2 
It is lndeed on11 1~ a Judgment that the lntellect 
aff1rms exlstenoe ot an essenoe. The abstract concept 'man l 
ltself does not say &n1thlng about eX1.tence. Exlstence ls 
not given wlth the ldea, not contalned ln It. fhls required 
a second operatlon of the lntellect, the Judgaent. Tben the 
lntellect affirms: 'Han exlsts'. 
fhis ls St. fhomas' doctrine, who writes: 'Prima 
quid .. operatl0 relplcltJpaaa naturaa rel •• seounda operati0 
reaplcl t lpsUIIl esse re1 •• 3 aut al 'both the e.sence and the 
existence are necessarl for the real thlng, 80 also both aots 
of the intellect are neoessary tor the .. plete knowledge ot 
the tblng. On11 when I have a oonoept ot a thlng and 1ft a 
Judgment attrlbutlng exlstence to lt can .7 knowledge be lald 
to be complete. In reallt1 the, alwaYI go together, and 'there 
are no concepts without Judgments nor an, Judpents w1 tbollt 
conceptI. Bot even tbe sl.ple apprehenslon of belng oan be 
-
./ 1 ~. Ql1son, Rea11sme Tho.lst" p. 225-226. 
J). 207. 
2 E. Gilson, ael,ni ~ .!9.!.! Ph11olophera, 
qu. V, Art. 3. 
3 fhomal AQulnas, III Boethlua, !!! 'rrin~tate. 
- 82 -
1 
wlthout JUdgment·. Slnce essence and exlstence always go 
together In the world ot reallty, so ther must also go together 
In the world ot knowledge. 
Concrete exlstenoe ls not present to the Intellect 
In Its concreteness, because the unlon ot thlng known wlth 
the knower takes place br means ot • Ipecle. whlch Is the 
abstract representatlon ot the thlng known. Stl11, In the 
Judgment the Intellect attlrms exlstence; and, theretore, It 
must percelve it in 80.e way. fhls oan be In no other wa, 
than In the phanta... There and only there, the unlon ot the 
knower wlth the concrete thlng known takes place. There. 
must, theretore, be an Intellectual Intultlon ot cODorete 
existence in the phantasa ot the .ense •• 
The importance ot the Intelleotual Judgment appears 
in this doctrine. It ls the Judgment whlch glves the ultlmate 
perteotlon to our knowledge. Th18 18 entlrel, In accordance 
w1th St. Thomas' teaohlngs, as Gl1son polnts out. -The Judg-
ment Is the most pertect operatlon ot reason because it Is the 
only on. that Is oapable to atta1n--belond the es.enoe ot 
belngs whlch ls apprehended by the concept-- that Ips~ !!!!, 
whloh Is known to be the very source ot all reallty l.2 
-
P. 209. 
1 E. G1lson, Belni and Some Phllosophers, 
2 E. Gllson, ~ Tho.lst~ V. ed, Par18, 1948 
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Tlit_ lntelleet can percelve this oonerete exlstence 
in the phantasm because ot the unlty ot the knower. "Selng 
1s nelther lntulted by a .enslbl11ty nor understood by an 
lntellect, but known by a aan t • l Or agaln, aa St. Thoaas 
says It: "Non enl. proprle loquendo sensus aut lntelleotus 
cognoselt, sed homo per utrumque·. 2 
. 
Man ls not d1vlded ln separate oo.part.enta whloh 
do not stand ln relatlon wlth each other. A too speelflo 
conslderatlon ln psychology ot the var10us facult1es mlght 
lead us to suoh an oplnlon. The unlon between the faoultles 
ls not an art1flclal or tactltlous one, but the unlon of a 
11vlng be1ng. Phllosophy should never loae slght ot the 
eonerete reallty lt studlel. 
Intellect and lenae. are both unlted ln the 8ubJeot. 
Thls makes lt pos81ble tor UI to accept thls lntellectual 
lntultlon whlch must acoompany every act ot 1fttellectual 
knowledge. 
More and more modera Thoalst. layoke a kind ot 
lntellectual lntu1t1on. Marlta1n glve. a deaoriptlon ot the 
states ln the proees. ot knowledge ln '.;;;;b;;;:;l;;;;;.;s .... ';.;;e;.;;.;n.c ... e~ .!!!! 
~xlst.nt·, ln whlch he shows how the 1ntu1t1on take. plaoe: 
P. 106. 
1 E. Gllson, ~ Selns ~ !!!! Ph1losophers, 
2 Thomas Aqulnas. ne Verltate Qu. 2.a-5. ad 3. 
........ I •• 
i 
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The second stage is the -formation - in one 
simultaneous awakening ot the intellect and the 
Judgment, which mutually involve each other- 01 
an idea ("this being" ror simply "this thlng- 1n 
which the idea ot being 1s impllcitly present) and 
a Judgment composlng the obJeot ot thought 1n 
question with the act of existing (not with the 
'not10n" of existence but with the Haot' ot existing): 
"this thing exists or "this being exists". 
In torming this Judgment the 1ntellect, on the one 
hand, knows the subJect· as s1ngular (1ndirectly and 
by reflexion upon the phantasMs) and on the other 
hand, afflrms that th1s singular subject exerclses 
the act ot exlsting. In other words, the intellect 
1tselt exerclses upon the notion ot thl. subJeot an 
act (the act ot atf1rmlng) by which 1t liTes 
tntentlonally the ex1stonce of the th1ng. !hi. 
attlrmet!on has the same content as the IfJUdp9ft,1 
of the estlmative and the external sense (but 1n 
thls case that content ls no longer -b11nd- bu' 
openly revealed slnoe 1t 1s ra1sed to the atate ot 
1ntelllg1bi11ty of act); and 1t 1s not by retlex10n 
upon the phantasms that the 1ntellect proffers the 
aff1rmation butt by and ln thls -Judgment· ltself, 
and ln this 1ntultion ot .ense which lt grasps by 
lmmaterlalls1ng 1t, in order to express lt to ltselt. 
It thus reaohes the actus .ssendl (In JudB1ac)- •• 
lt reach.s 8888noe- (1n oonce1v1ng)- by the m.dlatlon 
of sensor1al peroeptton-. l 
The solution of the problem 11es 1n the unlty ot human know-
ledge. When we rea11ze that nelther the senl.1 nor the 
intellect knows but that .an knows. that s.nses and lntelleot, 
though they are dlfferent facult1es, are nevertheless the 
tacult1es of one llving belng, we can understand the relatlo" 
between them. 
There ls a contlnu1ty trom senses to lntellect, a 
oontlnuity that is ~oss1ble beoause both are in the a.a. subJeot 




fhls makes it posslble to under.tand how the Intelleot can reaoh 
concrete reallty, whl1e It oannot express It in a concept. The 
analysis of the cognltlve facultles and thelr operatlons show 
UB thelr structure and way of actIng, and a reallstic notion or 
man as a livlng belng makes us understand how their combined 
aotivlty grasps reality. 
Thls posltlve part or his eplstemology certalnly 
shows Gilson at h1s best. Hls analysls ot the intelleotual 
knowledge 1s profound and olear. In a convinclng way h~ shows 
where and when exactly the human intelleot reaohel realIty. 
H1s pertect realism lR another merlt or hls exposl-
tion. In thl~ regard he ahowe hlmselt a true dlsclple ot 
Bergson who f1rst made European ph1losonh, take the road back 
to real1sm. Bergson showed hlm, as he dld Marltaln and 10 
many others, the fatal oonsequence. of Ideallem, and endowed 
hIm from the start of hls phllosophloal aotivltles with that 
passlon tor realIsm whioh was the oharacterlstl0 ot hIs own 
philosophy. In thom1sm, however, Gl1son found a sater and 
more perfect reallem than Bergson oould g1ve him. !homl88 
still developed thls senae for reallsm, atter he got thoroughly 
acquainted with 1t tor reallam ls .ssentlal 1n Thoalsm aa ln 
no other eystem. rhose other seekers ot realism 1n modern 
t1mes, the eXistentialists, also had thelr lntluence on him 1n 
maklng h1m more aware, where exactly to t1nd thIs reallty. The 
suooeedlng edit10ns ot ~ Thomls •• show this olearly •• Noonan 
I 
, I 
- 86 - 1 polnted out ln an .xcellent artlcle ln the New Scholastlcl ... 
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rlnally hls posltive eplstemology 1s entlrely based 
on St. Thomas. The many quotatlons trom hls works show oon-
v1no1ngly that lt ls tully ln conformlty wlth the teachlngs ot 
the angellc doctor. In a olearer and more expllclt way than ls 
done by St. Thomas, the stress ls put on reallsm, tor, although 
St. Thomas ls unmlstakenly a reallst, reallsm was never a 
problem tor hlm. Theretore, lt ls not brought lnto full 
evldenoe by hlm. Gllson presents the texts and shows their 
oontent ot reallsm to tull advantage. Ideal18m ln lts varlous 
torms made Thomlsts consclous ot thelr reall... Only ln the 
presenoe ot the enemy truth reoelves lts proper .. phasls. 
,'ar, then, trom orl tlcls1ng th18 part ot Gl1son' 8 
Eplstemology, we oan only pralse 1 t a.s a real a("vanoement ot 
Thomlstlc thought. Crltloal realists can agree wlth 1t and 
wl11 conslder 1t as a t1ne aohl.vea.nt whlch tlts entlrely 
lnto thelr system. In taot, .e tlnd the saae oplnlons as 
Gl1son's In some of the1r worke though not 11l eo developed a 
treatment. Thus Magr. Noel already had. polnted to the 
lntellectual lntultlon as a solutlon tor the questlon how the 
lntellect contacts reallty: 'In the reallty ot our psyoholog1-
cal 11te, there are no two awarenesses, the one senslble, the 
other lntelleotual, but only one whlch ls both at the same tlme. 
1 John Hoonan. 'The Exlstent1all .. ot E. 
Gllson'. New Soholasticlsm Oct. 195O;-p. 4i7-i3§. -- --
- 87 -
There 1s an intellectual qua.l-lntuitlon ot the realitle. 
1 present to sens1ble experlenoe l • 
One questlon could be asked, however, vlz. it this 
part ot eplstemology does not more belong to psycbolog7 than 
to eplstemology. Ep1stemology, 1t 1t wants to be a d1so1p11ne 
distinct trom psyohology, should have a dltterent toraal object. 
The lnqulry lnto the value ot human knowledge ls, as has been 
shown, a question whloh apparently does not oome under 
psychology. However, when we start analyslng the lntelleotual 
aot ot knowledge to tind out how lt attalns reallty, .e are 
already 1n the tield ot psychology, the tormal object ot whloh 
is the structure o~ the ontology ot human knowledge. This is 
also Van Rietls oplnlon: 'Our opinion 1s that the ontology ot 
knowledge has no proper critioal value, but that lt transposes 
and 1nterprets very well the concluslons or the desoription ot 
the cognltive phenomenon 1n order to evaluate It. In the 
analysls one 'sees', in the ontology ot knowledge one 
tunderetande·. 2 
Th1s makes us understand also why Gl1eon oan produce 
so many quotat10ns trom 8t. Thomas, because thls 1s psychology. 
As was explained, 8t. Thomas has a hlghly developed psychology, 
whereas lt wl11 be extremely ditt10ult to tlnd texts ln h1s 
1 alt. In: ·Some Tendencles in Modern 
~homlsm', by Dom Illtyd Trethowan:-»ownelae Revlew. Spring 1949, 
P. 154; 2 Van H1et, Ep18temologle Thomlste, p. 656. 
, 
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work ot • strlotl, eplstemologlcal charaoter. 
However, the dlstlnotlon cannot be atretohed too 
tar. As the object 1s glven 1n the act ot knowledge and there 
1s no act ot knowledge posslble wlthout an object, ep18teaology 
and pS1oholog1 oannot be entirel, Independent ot eaoh other. 
There Is and always must be an lntlmate oonnectlon between the 
two. Wben we torget th1s, we tall agaln In the old error whloh 
was the oause ot Ideallsm, viz. oonslderlng as d1stlnot In 
rea11ty, what ln real llte Is one. We oannot oonsider thought 
wlthout the obJeot whloh It Implle., oonslder1ng thought 





In the Introduotlon to ~elng ~ !2!! Philosophers 
Gilson wrlte. that It Is talse to thlnk that "tundamental 
philosophlcal oppos1tlons necessarlly happened between truth 
and error, instead ot being b.~ween partlal truths and the 
whole truth·. l The history ot Chrlstlan phl10sophy Is there 
to prove thIs statement. From the earllest 4&1e ot Chrlstianity 
when the ApologIsts looked tor contlrmatlon ot thelr falth In 
the worke ot Greek. phllosophers, phl1osophy hal always started 
w1th an examInatIon of the pagan phl1osophers (Plato and 
Arlstotle), separatIng truth troll error and adaptIng the truth 
in their syste. or building their syste. wlth ita aid. There 
has been no more diligent searcher tor truth on all places in 
whioh it could be tound than the greatest ot Christian 
Philosophers, St. Thomas AquInas. HIs was certalnly not the 
attltude of the conaervatlve m1nd, whlch teara to agree with 
propos1t1ons ot pagan phIlosophers because ot the error that 
may be contained in thelr syste.. He was the tearless champ10n 
ot truth; and It 1s doubttul that ve vll1 ever tlnd out what 
he had to endure because ot hIs Intrepld stand. Then as well 
as now and in any t1me, the large army ot the mediocre kept the 
fleld; true progress never came through the ma8se •. 
pIX. 
1 E. Gilson. Belng ~ $o.~ Ph1losophers, 
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'" It is astonlshlng, however, that one who 1n hil 
books proves to be such a devoted dlsclple of the great 
master, and is well aware ot the presenoe of truth am1d error, 
dev1ates troa this att1tude 1n ep1stemology. for here he not 
only condemns ldeall .. but seems unable to dist1ngulsh any 
element ot truth ln 1t. He ieems not to be aware that ldeallsm 
also, as all other erroneoul system. betore 1t, may oontribute 
ita share to the turther progress of human thought. Hot 
everyth1ng ln Descartes and lant 18 error. Why then oondemn 
them completely and refuse to exam1ne these great ph1losophers 
to see 1t 80me truth mlght be found 1n thea whioh oan ba 
lncorporated 1nto the pattern ot !boalstio philosophy' 
Phl10sophy 18 a 11vlng science. There oan be no 
golng back to Plato or Aristotle or even to the Middle Ag ••• 
Truth is eternal and there ls no change ln 1 t, but the human 
race ls developlng and phllosophy happens to be .9!l trut!,!, 
but vha t man grasR8 9.! truth. Every tllle has 1 ta own preble.a. 
The phlloBOphy or another tl •• vlll not tlt, or not tlt ent1rely 
to thls tlme. 
The epistemological probl •• i. p,tecullar to modern 
time.. Whether thls problaa is the reault ot a per10d of 
decadence ln the study ot ph1loaophy ls not important; the 
only Questlon 1s whether or not lt 18 a lawful question. 
Gilson hia.elf denle. that he haa ever 8ald that the 
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eplstemo1og1oal problem vas a talse probl ... l But lt it ls 
a lawtul Quest1on, lt should reoelve an ansver trom Thomlstl0 
phl1osophy. There oan be no golng back to a preorltloal 
stage. 2 Thoml.m has to adapt It •• lt to the requlr .. ents ot 
the modern mlnd. 
That ls what most .Thom1stlc phllosophers aav qulte 
clearly and what led to crltlcal reallsm. In ordinary 11te 
everybody 1s a reallst, even the ldeallst. are. But 'what 
men so lnfalllbly know qua •• n, they so otten overlook qua 
ph11osophers-. 3 But 1s not there then a way to show tha1 
th1s real1sm ot ever1body 1s solentltlcally Justltled? 
Or1t1cal real1sts thlnk there 18, and that Is exaotly the way 
Idealists use 1n the1r attempt to prove their 14eal1 .. , Via. 
the cr1tlcal examlnation ot buman knowl~ •• 
Emmanuel Ohapman glve. an excellent aummary ot it: 
'The orude knowledge ot genu1ne common .en.e, charged 
wlth ontological densitl •• , unrefined as y.t by the 
apecial teohniques ot the emplrloal and aathematlcal 
sciences, must be defended philosophioally again.' 
both the Ideallst and the empirlc1st, who w1l1 ftot 
admit any knowledge as valld other than what conforms 
w1th the1r preoonce1ved not1ons. the ph1losophy ot 
oritlcal realism does not d1smlss, nor look down 
upon, but Justltles, what 18 valld 1n the presolen-
t1tle knowledge ot oommon .en •••• 
/' 1 E. Gilson, Reallsme ~ho.iste, p. 36-note. 
2 i. Gilson, ~ Reallsme Xithodlgue, p. 15. 
p. IX. 
3 E. Gilson, yelns!9S Is!! Philosophera, 
4 E. OhApman, -'0 Be - !hat 1s the Answer l • 
Marl ta1n Volume ot the Tholllst • nr. - - - . 
:-
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~ To institute this cr1t1cal examlnatlon ot our know-
ledge, that ls what Kant and Descartes taught modern philosophy. 
Although they were wrong 1n the concluslons the, drew, thelr 
error prooeded not trom the question ltselt but trom the taot 
that they did not approach 1t w1th an unblased mln4. 
Everybody wl11 agpee that 1deall88 1s a real danger. 
Thomists should always b. on their guard against It. It 18 
oertaln that In the past 80.. ot them have gone too tar 1n 
the1r adaptatIon and thereby have endangered ~ho.l... Nothing 
1s more contrary to the splrit ot Thomlam than Ideallam. 
Although some mlstake. were made when a reawakened Soholastio1 .. 
was oontronted tor the tlrst time w1th the problems ot modern 
phllosophy, the outstand1ng Thomlsta ot our tl.es are avare 
ot the danger. They are unanimous In orltloal reall ... 
That'Gl1sen has a special concern w1th realIsm 1. 
understandable. He wltnessed the struggle tor a realIst1c 
philosophy ot hls master Sergson. He shoved hlm the deplorable 
state to wh10h two oenturle. ot Ide.llsm had led European 
phl1osophy. It took the glgant1c ettorts ot sen1uses l1ke 
c.. Bergson, Husserl and others to make Europen ph1losophy oon-
so1ous that 1t had been 1ntested-hi ldea11sm as by a oentagiou • 
. 
dlsease. And notw1thstandlng all 'he1r etforts, ldeall_ 1. 
tar trom dead but 8tl11 has 1'. chaIrs 1n the promInent 
unlversltles of Europe. 
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Gllson 18 aware ot the danger 1dea11sa contalns tor 
phllo sophy , and that accounts tor hls repeated warnlng •• 
Modern Thomlats certalnly appreolate these warnlngs, especlally 
when the come trom an authorlty 11ke Gl1son. But when these 
warn1ngs become aotual aocusat10ns, and Gllson says that they 
have already tallen 1nto Ideallstic error, crltlcal reallata 
thlnk that he Is wrong. Caretul readIng ot thelr treatlsea 
ahows how caretul the, have been to avold thls error, how they 
never lose slght ot the danger ot ldeallam. 
The tact, however, that there 1s danger connected 
wlth orltlque does not make them retrain trom 1t, tor they 
thlnk that although ·orltlque may have been born trom the 
19norance ot tradltlonal realism*,l it beoame neceasary, 
nevertheless 1n modern ph11osophy, and does not oontaln In 
ltselt anyth1ng wh!oh 18 1n oontrad1ct10n with 1t. 
The merlt ot Gilaon's works ot episte.ology lies 1n 
the posltlve par~, the analys1s ot the act ot knowledge. Sere 
Gllson shows his orattmanshlp. These pages are tull ot 
penetratlng lns1ghts 1n the structure ot knowledge, and betra, 
the man who has been a constant reader and student ot St. 
Thomas' works tor years. 
Gllson·s later works as Be1ng ~!2!! Phlloso~her. 
and L'Etr • .!! L'Essence, are the further de"V'elopment ot what 
can be tound alread1 In aeallsm. Tho.lst. !! Crltlque ~ !! 
1 " ,,-L. Noel, ReVie Neoscolastlque, 1940, p. 58. 
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Conna1.sanie. In a more extenslve way he explains there the 
ex1stentlal value ot human knowledge. More and more he 
becomes convlnced that onlT aotual contact ot our lntellect 
wlth the concrete exlstenoe can oonstitute a genulne knowledge 
ot rea11tl. and that th1s oontact takes place 1n an 1ntellect-
ual quasl-lntu1t10n. H1s exposltions there are oertalnll a 
real progress over the earller explanat10ns ot crit10al 
rea11sts, though the, also have been aware ot this and stressed 
the lmportanoe ot the Judgment in epistemology. 
In Gilsonte ep1stemology, 1n a tuller sense than 1n 
the precedlng cr1tical epistemologies ·ph1losophy becomes 
agaln the full lntellectual actlvity ot the whole man contront-
1 lng the whole ot experience M • 
Thls was also what philosophy was tor st. Thomas. He 
never had the probl .. h1m8elt, "Ne1ther Arlstotle nor St. Thomas 
telt the need to qual1ty them.elves as realists·. 2 But the 
philosophy ot St. Thomas 1s certalnly areallst1c one. H1s 
whole system asks tor a realIstic 1nterpretation. One cannot 
explain 1t ln an 1dea11etlc war without deetror1ng 1t. St. 
Thomas ls one ot the Mgreat rea11sts' aa de Tonquedec calli 
theB;3 he is the greatest ot them. 
E. )( • Chapman. The Haritaln Volume ot the 
........... - I ..................... 
1 
Thomlst, p. 136 
2 J. Marltaln. Degrees ~ Knowledge, p. 87 
Connala.ance, p. i49~' de Tonquedec. ~ Orit1que ~!! 
------------------............ 
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~ Thererore, or1t1cal ~eallsm can appeal to St. ThQaa •• 
It 1s ent1rely 1n acoord wlth hlm and oan be called a further 
development or Thomlstlc prlnciple.. It Is a Thomistlc Answer 
on a question asked by moderns. The fact that we do not tind 
1t 1n h1s work 1s no reason to reject 1t. It would be It 1t 
could be proved that reall .. , 1s 1n contradlction to Tho.lltlc 
prlnclples. St. Thomas'. 81stem shows a gap In this relpeat 
that he has no eplstemologl. Modern ph1losophers have the 
'ask to glve a solutIon to problems whlch he hlaselt never 
consldered, provlded thl. solution 18 1n acoordanoe wlth hII 
prlnciples. Th1s shows the greatness or hls philosophy and 
Its value tor all tl.es, that every age oan us. 1t to tlnd 
the solutlons tor It. partIcular probleas, tor 'the greatness 
ot a ph1losophy comes from Its aptItude to reach beyond the 
problems 1t poses, and to trIumph over those 1t dId not even 
1 
suspeot'. 
1 H. Oouh1er, 01t: G. Van RIet.-!RlstemologI8 
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